Accelerators: Their Fit in the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem and Their Cohort Selection Challenges by Yang, Shu
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
5-2019 
Accelerators: Their Fit in the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem and 
Their Cohort Selection Challenges 
Shu Yang 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3247 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCELERATORS: THEIR FIT IN THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP ECOSYSTEM AND THEIR 
COHORT SELECTION CHALLENGES 
  
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SHU YANG 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Business in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2019 
SHU YANG 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
iii 
 
 
Accelerators: Their Fit in the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem and Their Cohort Selection 
Challenges 
 
by  
 
Shu Yang 
 
 
 
 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Business in satisfaction 
of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date  Ramona K. Zachary 
Chair of Examining Committee 
Date  Karl Lang 
Executive Officer 
 
 
Supervisory Committee: 
         Ramona K. Zachary 
Romi Kher 
      Thomas S. Lyons 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
 
 
 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
Accelerators: Their Fit in the Entrepreneurship Ecosystem and Their Cohort Selection 
Challenges 
 
by  
Shu Yang  
Advisor: Ramona Zachary 
 
The entrepreneurial financing landscape has drastically evolved over the past two decades with 
many of the new entrants (e.g., crowdfunders, accelerators, incubators, etc) rapidly rising to 
prominence (Block et al., 2016). Evolving from the incubator model, startup accelerators have 
similarly gained traction over the past decade (Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, & Van Hove, 2016).  
While the number of published articles focusing on accelerators has been growing, extant 
research has yet to clearly delineate the accelerator phenomena conceptually and more 
importantly, empirically examine its selection mechanism. This dissertation addresses this gap 
and is composed of two parts. In the first part, I will introduce a conceptual model that explains 
where accelerators fit in the venture creation pipeline and how different types of accelerators 
create unique value in the respective entrepreneurial ecosystem. Second, given the significant 
role played by social startups in contributing to the broader society, I will focus on one important 
but under-researched type of accelerator – the Social Impact Accelerator (SIA) - to empirically 
examine its selection criteria and highlight how the founder’s gender influences the economic 
and social signals sent by the social startup.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background Information 
Entrepreneurship finance landscape has drastically changed over the last two decades as 
many new players (e.g., crowdfunding, accelerators, and family offices, etc) have entered the 
arena (Block, Colombo, Cumming, & Vismara, 2017). Evolving from the incubator model, 
startup accelerators have gained traction over the past ten years (Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, & 
Van Hove, 2016).  Since the formation of Y-Combinator, widely considered to be the first 
accelerator, 170 US-based accelerators invested in more than 5,000 US-based startups with a 
median investment of $100,000 from 2005 to 2013., These companies raised a total of $19.5 
billion in funding during this period (Hathaway, 2016). This accelerator phenomenon is also 
growing globally. According to the Global Accelerator Report (2016), more than 200 million 
dollars was invested into 11,305 startups by 579 accelerator programs across five global regions 
in 2016. F6S.com, a website that provides services to accelerators and similar startups programs, 
listed over 7,000 accelerator programs worldwide at the end of year 2017.  
Similar to incubators, accelerators help startups define their ideas, build their initial 
prototypes, identify promising customer segments, and provide networking opportunities to 
external investors and industry experts. But distinct from the traditional incubation model that 
charges clients a space rental fee, accelerator programs provide small amounts of seed capital to 
selected startups in exchange for their equity meant to “accelerate” the venture creation process. 
These selected startups have only several weeks or several months to complete this process, and 
are then expected to present their final pitch to a large audience of qualified investors on their 
“Demo-Day” to graduate (Cohen, 2013). As the newest type of startup assistance organization in 
the entrepreneurship ecosystem, which bridges the funding gap for startups and information gap 
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for external investors, accelerators have gained acknowledgement as the key contributor to the 
rate of business startup success (Dempwolf et al., 2014) and regional economy development 
(Hochberg & Fehder, 2015; Hochberg, 2016). People who advocate for accelerators compare 
them to business schools in the second half of the 19th century, arguing that the emergence of 
business schools back then was due to the educational need for professional managers, and in the 
same vein, the emergence of accelerators nowadays is due to the educational need for preparing 
nascent entrepreneurs to be more competent in venture creation.  
Along with practitioners, scholars have also noticed this emerging trend and realized the 
critical role accelerators play in the startup ecosystem (e.g., Block et al., 2017). A growing body 
of accelerator studies has explored the definition and domain of accelerators (e.g., Cohen, 2013), 
the boundary between accelerators, incubators and equity investors (e.g., Cohen, 2013; 
Hochberg, 2016), and the different types of accelerators (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2016; Dempwolf et 
al., 2014). Research has also explored preliminary “acceleration effects” on cohort companies 
(e.g., Battistella et al., 2017; Hallen, Bingham, & Cohen, 2014; Cohen, Bingham, & Hallen, 
2018) and regional entrepreneurship ecosystems (e.g., Hochberg & Fehder, 2015; Hochberg, 
2016). Table 1 provides a detailed overview of academic research on accelerators published in 
the last decade.  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
After reviewing accelerator literature, I identify three trends in this research area: First, 
the number of published articles focusing on accelerator research has been growing, especially in 
the last three years, indicating increasing interest from more scholars. Second, the term 
“accelerator” has become an umbrella term that includes different accelerator types (e.g., private 
for-profit seed accelerators, university-based accelerators, corporate accelerators, and social 
impact accelerators); however, the development of each type of accelerator is imbalanced as 
private for-profit accelerators and corporate accelerators have attracted relatively more attention, 
leaving social impact accelerators and university-based accelerators unexamined (e.g., Kohler, 
2016; Kanbach & Stubner, 2016; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015; Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 
2017). Third, although a different typology of accelerators has been identified and proposed 
(Dempwolf et al., 2014; Hochberg, 2016), extant research has not either clearly differentiated 
these accelerators conceptually or empirically examined their different impacts on both startups 
and broader entrepreneurship ecosystems.  
To advance our understanding of this accelerator phenomenon, my dissertation will be 
composed of two main parts: 1) I will introduce a conceptual model that is able to explain where 
accelerators fit in the venture creation pipeline, and through application of this conceptual model 
I will further explain how different types of accelerators create unique value to startups in the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem; and 2) Given the significant role played by social startups in 
contributing to the broader society, I will focus on one important but under-researched type of 
accelerator — Social Impact Accelerators (SIAs) — which aim to bridge the “pioneer gap” (Lall, 
Bowles, & Baird, 2013) between social startups and cautious impact investors (for example, 
corporate philanthropists).  
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1. 3 Dissertation Structure 
 My dissertation will follow the structure as follows:  
 In chapter 2, I will provide a comprehensive literature review of accelerators and propose 
a revised definition of the accelerator. Current definitions of accelerators are fragmented, and 
lack of a united theoretical base leads to boundary confusion. I apply the Entrepreneurial Venture 
Creation Theory (Mishra & Zachary, 2014) to identify the position and defining features of 
accelerators, to differentiate accelerators from other similar institutions such as incubators and 
venture capitalists, and to propose a revised definition of the accelerator. Moreover, my proposed 
dual-role conceptual model could also help people understand the heterogeneity among different 
accelerators.  
In chapter 3, I will conceptually discuss three existing subsystems that have direct 
influences on entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurship ecosystem — the supporting subsystem, the 
financing subsystem, and the incubation subsystem (Dee, Gill, Weinberg, & McTavis, 2015). 
Then, I will elaborate where accelerators fit in and map how these different subsystems 
systematically help startups move up from the pre-startup stage to the early-startup stage 
(Lichtenstein & Lyons, 2006). More specifically, I will also explain how different types of 
accelerators should be designed differently based on their positions in the pipeline and unique 
values that they can bring to their selected startups. 
 After I have discussed values of different types of accelerators, in chapter 4, I will focus 
on one specific type of accelerator,SIAs, and empirically examine their selection results. It is 
interesting to investigate how institutions that are embedded with two competing logics (like 
SIAs) of pursuing both economic outcomes and social outcomes make selection decisions. 
Questions to be addressed include: Do accelerators unconsiciously prefer one over another, or do 
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they have very independent and parallel selection logics? Which type of social startup is more 
likely to be selected, and why? Do accelerators’ selection results match their selection logic? In 
this chapter, I will first introduce signaling theory and gender role congruity theory, develop 
moderation hypotheses, and then empirically examine 2,324 social startups that applied for 123 
accelerators worldwide in 2016 and 2017 by using the Entrepreneurship Database Program 
initiated by Emory University and Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurship (ANDE). I 
believe my findings will make theorectial contributions to both signaling theory and accelerator 
research. I also hope my study will reveal practical meanings to both social entrepreneurs who 
attempt to use institutional intermediaries to bridge the investment gap strategically and SIAs 
who are interested in improving their venture development performance.  
 In the last chapter, chapter 5, I will summarize my findings from each chapter and also 
discuss limitations and future research opportunities in this area.  
1.4 Contribution and Significance 
There are three main theoretical contributions my dissertation seeks to make. First, in 
general, this study contributes to accelerator literature by delineating and reconceptualizing the 
boundary of this new form of institution. Moreover, my study helps people understand the 
unique values brought by (different types of) accelerators to the entrepreneurship ecosystem 
along the venture creation pipeline. It is important for young entrepreneurs who are seeking to 
form strategic alliances with powerful and legitimate partners to secure their resources and 
overcome their “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965) despite feeling confused about where 
to start. My dissertation strives to provide a visual map for young entrepreneurs to make the 
important decision to choose their resource providers at very early stages. I attempt to answer  
questions that are frequently asked by young entrepreneurs, such as: Should we seek out an 
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incubator or an accelerator, and when? Which type of accelerator should we consider? Given the 
time and efforts that young entrepreneurs need to devote to accelerators’ application processes, I 
would strongly suggest they be mindful and choose the accelerator that suits their startups’ needs 
the most. Otherwise the mismatching between startups and their accelerators will cause wasted 
time and resources.  
Second, my dissertation contributes to signaling theory (Spence, 1973) by revealing the 
moderation effect of gender stereotype bias on signaling effects. Since Spence’s (1973) seminal 
work, signaling theory has been widely applied in many scenarios across a broad range of 
disciplines (BliegeBird & Smith, 2005; Connelly et al., 2011), and the entrepreneurship area, a 
typical type of an asymmetric market in which exchange parties entrepreneurs/startups and 
outside investors do not have equal information in terms of a startup’s latent quality, serves as an 
appropriate setting to apply signaling theory.  My dissertation enriches signaling theory and 
highlights the cognitive perspective of signals and their interpretation. Drover, Wood and Corbett 
(2017) state that “the vast majority of research on organizational signaling tends to investigate 
the ways in which a positive signal — in isolation — influences the decision-making of external 
constituents (p. 2)” and point out the flawed fundamental assumption of most prior 
organizational studies that apply signaling theory — the assumption that all signals are noticed 
equally by everyone, and signaling interpretations by organizational evaluators are rational and 
unidirectional. This trend in fact limits the explanatory power of signaling theory because in the 
complex organizational context, decision-makers often attend to and need to interpret competing 
signals. Although I could not directly test the cognitive effects of social impact accelerators 
(SIAs) due to the limitedness of the data, my study counters this trend and indicates how 
“perceived incongruity” of signals will moderate the signal effects on SIA selection results.  
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Last but not least, this study also contributes to social entrepreneurship literature. 
Although social entrepreneurship research has gained traction in the last decade, social 
entrepreneurs are still facing more challenges than commercial entrepreneurs. Given the 
resource-poor condition, social entrepreneurs might need more external resources to help them 
take off. Chapter 4 of my dissertation examines a specific type of accelerator, social impact 
accelerator, which focuses on helping ventures that are driven by their social missions. However, 
the moderating effects of gender stereotypes on signals suggest that it is unavoidable that SIAs 
are embedded with subconscious biases, and these ingrained gender stereotypes will significantly 
influence their final selection results. The empirical findings described in chapter 4 reveal that in 
order to be selected by SIAs, social startups need to communicate both types of signals, 
economic signals and social signals, to SIAs parallelly. However, social entrepreneurs also need 
to be careful, because information (e.g., gender of the entrepreneurs) may unintentionally 
interfere with the signaling interpretation process and distort the intended meaning of signals.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
CHAPTER 2 THE DUAL-ROLE MODEL OF ACCELERATORS: REDEFINITION AND 
RECONCEPTUALIZATION  
The definition and domain of accelerators remains unclear to most scholars and 
practitioners. Some scholars argue that the accelerator model is an extension of earlier incubator 
models (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2016) and the most salient feature of accelerators is its intensive 
time frame (several weeks to a couple of months) (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014). Conversely, other 
scholars argue that accelerators function more as equity investors whose goals are financial 
return, rather than charging space fee. However, most arguments focus on delineating those 
observable forms or operational features adopted by accelerators, rather than unveiling their core 
essence. To the best of my knowledge, no united theoretical explanation so far has been 
proposed to clearly delineate the boundary of accelerators and distinguish it from other similar 
domains and explain observable differences across accelerator programs.  
In order to explore and clarify myths amid the accelerator phenomenon, this chapter will 
focus on delineating the accelerator’s boundary by 1) distinguishing accelerators from other 
similar institutions (e.g, incubators, equity investors, etc) by applying the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem pipeline model (Lichtenstein & Lyons, 2006); 2) proposing a unified framework 
theoretically explaining the rationale of the existence of accelerators by borrowing the 
Entrepreneurial Value Creation Theory (Mishra & Zachary, 2014); and 3) differentiating 
variations across various accelerator programs by proposing a practical taxonomy. The goal of 
this chapter is to propose a theoretical base and to reconceptualize and redefine accelerators.  
To do so, I will first review existing literature of accelerators and highlight its definition 
issues.  I will then apply the Entrepreneurial Value Creation Theory to elucidate the rationale of 
the existence of accelerators and propose the Dual-Role theoretical model. Last, I will apply this 
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Dual-Role model to explain wide variations found across different accelerator programs and 
redefine the accelerator.  
2.1 Definition Issue of Accelerators  
Given the newness of the accelerator phenomena, there is little published research on 
accelerators (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014). Most known literature focuses on clarifying the 
definition of the accelerator (e.g., Cohen, 2013), identifying its characteristics (e.g., Cohen & 
Hochberg, 2014; Radojevich-Kelley & Hoffman, 2012; Dempwolf et al., 2014), tracking their 
impacts on startups (e.g., Winston-Smith & Hannigan, 2014), and ecosystem development (e.g., 
Hochberg & Fehder, 2015; Winston-Smith & Hannigan, 2014). However, people still generally 
feel confused about the accelerator due to its similarities to other institutions (e.g., micro-
enterprises, incubators, small business development centers, angel investors, and other equity 
investors, etc) and its heterogeneity across different accelerator programs.  
Although some scholars consider the accelerator model as a special extending and 
evolving model from the incubator model (e.g., Pauwels et al., 2016), most researchers endeavor 
to define the boundary of the accelerator by delineating it from the incubator model and other 
similar institutions (e.g., Cohen, 2013; Cohen & Hochberg, 2014; Dempwolf et al., 2014). For 
example, Cohen (2013) proposed a working definition of accelerator, which is “a fixed term, 
cohort-based program, including mentorship and educational components, that culminates in a 
public pitch event or demo-day.” Based on this definition, Cohen and Hocheberg (2014) stated 
that “perhaps the most fundamental difference is the limited duration of accelerator programs 
compared to the continuous nature of incubators and angel investment (p.4).” To distinguish 
accelerator programs from accelerator entities, Dempwolf, Auer, & D’Ippolito (2014) modified 
this definition by focusing on their business models and defined the accelerator program as 
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“business entities that make seed-stage investments in promising companies in exchange for 
equity as part of a fixed-term, cohort-based program, including mentorship and educational 
components, that culminates in a public pitch event, or demo-day (p.27).”  
Additionally, scholars also acknowledged that there are great variations shown across 
different accelerator programs. For example, Cohen and Hocheberg (2014) pointed out “such 
programs may be for-profit or non-profit, and may vary in the amount of stipend, the size of the 
equity stake taken, the length of the mentorship and educational program, the availability of co-
working space and in industry vertical focus. Some are affiliated with venture capital firms or 
angel groups, some with corporations, and other within universities or local governments or non-
governmental organizations (P.5).” Dempwolf et al (2014) categorizes accelerator programs into 
three broad categories; they are 1) university accelerators, which are “educational nonprofits,” 2) 
corporate accelerators, whose goal is to gain competitive advantage for the corporate parents, 
and 3) innovation accelerators, which are stand-alone, for-profit ventures. After investigating 13 
accelerators, Pauwels and his colleagues (2016) identified five key design building blocks to 
categorize accelerators into the “ecosystem builder,” the “deal-flow maker,” and the “welfare 
stimulator.”  
However, the definition issue remains because none of these definitions or approaches is 
sufficient to fully explain the accelerator’s function and its impact on startups. Although Cohen’s 
definition clearly states four distinguishable characteristics of accelerators from the operational 
perspective and emphasizes the services and educational component provided to those 
entrepreneurs at early stage (which can be used to differentiate accelerator from angel investors), 
it does not mention the financial support and engagement from accelerators. One of the most 
important features of accelerators is to provide necessary funds to help startups grow 
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(Radojevich-Kelley & Hoffman, 2012), despite whether accelerators are for-profit or whether 
they take equity from startups. As Hathaway (2016) specifies, “Startup accelerators support 
early-stage, growth-driven companies through education, mentorship, and financing.” Cohen and 
Hochberg (2014, p.13) also acknowledged that “while accelerators are often compared to 
incubators, they are more similar as angel investors.” In contrast, Dempwolf, Auer, & D’Ippolito 
(2014) modified this definition by adding the “seed-stage capital provision” element, but their 
definition is so narrow that it is only limited to accelerators that seek equity exchange. 
Additionally, extant comparative studies have not provided a clear delineation between 
accelerators and other similar institutions, which is understandable given that the conversation 
about the definition and domain of accelerator is still not settled. Although these comparisons 
indeed explain to some degree how accelerator programs are different from other similar 
institutions, they also add more confusion for practitioners/entrepreneurs as too many features 
are compared across these articles. More specifically, while some features are at operational 
level (e.g., duration, office provision, etc), some features are at design level (e.g., strategic focus, 
selection process, etc). These fragmented, solitary, and independent comparisons do not advance 
our understanding of this phenomenon by disclosing the fundamental differences among these 
institutions, since they do not examine the core differences embedded in initial designs, nor do 
they theoretically explain the uniqueness of accelerators. Only if scholars elaborate these 
differences from the deep, core, and design-level perspective can these surface differences can be 
philosophically aligned and logically explained, rather than simply being observed and listed. 
Only in this way nascent entrepreneurs can gain more understandings and know how to practice 
by comprehending the underlining logic of this accelerator phenomenon.  
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Thirdly, current literature only mentions the heterogeneity of different accelerator 
programs, without theoretically, systematically and logically explaining reasons why the 
heterogeneity exists and whether there are some coherences across all these heterogeneous 
programs. And if the answer is “yes,” how can entrepreneurs understand this buried coherence 
and find the best suitable accelerator program? Further, how should accelerator managers design 
their programs in a more logical and effective way by aligning these different pieces all together? 
To resolve all these three confusions, we need a unified and integrated theoretical 
framework within which we can place all discrepancies and see their interplay. I will apply the 
entrepreneurial value creation theory as this general framework to review, reconceptualize, and 
redefine the accelerators domain.  
To begin, I will explain the core difference between accelerators and incubators in terms 
of their targeted users. Then I propose to review the entrepreneurial process through the lens of 
Entrepreneurial Value Creation Theory (Mishra & Zachary, 2014), and distinguish accelerators 
and other similar institutions in terms of their contributions to this value creation process. Next, I 
will illustrate why accelerator programs are heterogeneous from their operational model, and 
what main factors impact this heterogeneity.  At the end of this chapter, I will propose an 
updated working definition based on the current definition proposed by Cohen (2013).  
2.1.1 Startups’ “readiness”  
Generally, all these three institutions can be simply perceived as supportive organizations 
for potential early-stage ventures; however, they have different selection criteria when they 
select specific “potential” startups. In this section, I propose that the startup’s “readiness” is 
another influential selection criterion adopted by these institutions. While capitalists usually 
focus on these “potential and ready” startups, most literature suggests that, as early-stage startup 
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supporters, incubators and accelerators focus more on those “potential but not ready yet” 
startups.   
To differentiate accelerators from incubators, we need to ask a deeper question: What 
does “not ready yet” mean? Is the implication that they are not ready in general, or that they are 
not ready in only some specific areas? 
2.1.2 Two Dimensions of “not-ready” 
Tech-not-ready Startups. This type of startup is still in its very early stage, in which their 
technology has not fully or sufficiently developed yet. The focus at this stage is to enhance the 
startup’s capability of developing its prototypes and  making itsr products/service functional and 
commercializable. Due to their weakness and fragility at this sensitive stage, these startups need 
protection from trustworthy institutions to help them survive this phase.  
Market-Not-Ready Startups. This type of startup is “not ready for market.” Usually this 
type of startup has a relatively complete concept of its product/services, and most of the time 
they already have prototypes. They are still at their early stage because their products/services 
have not been tested or have not yet connected to market/potential users. 
As Cohen and Hochberg (2014) mentioned, “Philosophically, incubators are designed to 
nurture nascent ventures by buffering them from the environment, providing them room to grow 
in a space sheltered from market forces. Accelerators, in contrast, are designed to speed up 
market interactions in order to help nascent ventures adapt quickly and learn.”  
2.2 Entrepreneurial Venture Creation Theory 
Acknowledging that the process of value creation is central to the conceptualization of 
entrepreneurship, Mishra and Zachary (2014) define entrepreneurship as “a process of value 
creation and appropriation led by entrepreneurs in an uncertain environment (p.5).” They posit 
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that the desire for entrepreneurial reward, instead of greed, drives entrepreneurs to create wealth, 
which benefits all individuals who participate in entrepreneurial activities. By integrating 
multiple theories, they provide this comprehensive and unified theory, namely, the 
Entrepreneurial Value Creation Theory. This theory divides the entrepreneurial reward pursuit 
process into two stages. Stage 1 is “Formulation,” which refers to early and nascent processes 
which entrepreneurs use to fully develop their entrepreneurial competencies in order to enter into 
the next stage — “Monetization,” which refers to venture capitalists stepping in to the realization 
of the entrepreneurial reward (e.g., acquisiton or IPO). They also point out that most failures 
happen during this transition because not all nascent entrepreneurs are capabable of developing 
their entrepreneurial competencies.  
 In general, entrepreneurial competence should be fully developed in the first stage, 
including both product developmental capability and market access capability. It embeds the 
entrepreneurial resources including the entrepreneurs’ human capital, social capital, family 
capital, emotional capital, and knowledge capital.Those resources are modulated by 
entrepreneurs’ intentions. Through entrepreneurs’ effectuation efforts, they will adjust and adapt 
their recognized opportunitities to match their resources and intentions. This formulation process 
will iterate several times until entrepreneurs’ competencies are fully developed and enter into the 
monetization stage. Many ventures may fail during stage 1, so they do not even have a chance to 
move on to stage 2.  
 In stage 2, the entrepreneurial competence is linked to the due diligence modulator and 
the business model multiplier. The due dilligence modulator evaluates and qualifies the 
entrepreneurial competence before an investment can be made. Since entrepreneurs tend to 
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signal their entrepreneurial ability, the due dilligence modulator screens and qualifies the venture 
to protect the investors from adverse selection risks.  
 This framework does not only disclose this dynamic entrepreneurial process, including 
effectuation, iteration and screening; it also suggests reasons why startups fail before they realize 
entrepreneurial reward. First, most startups fail in developing their competencies in the first stage 
because they cannot unify their intentions, resources, and recognized opportunities together 
through the effectuation process. Those startups cannot even transition from stage 1 toe stage 2 
successfully. Second, even though some startups are competent enough to enter into stage 2, they 
are still highly likely to fail to convince investors due to information asymmetry and adverse 
selection. Thus, we can presume that for nascent entrepreneurs, succesffuly transitioning from 
stage 1 to stage 2 is a critical milestone in their entrepreneurial value creation process. 
 Apparently, venture development organizations (VDOs) such as incubators, technology 
transfer centers, and small business development centers, focusing on providing services to help 
nascent entrepreneurs, iterates their formulation processes in stage 1 (e.g., Aerts, Matthyssens, & 
Vandenbempt, 2007; Allen & Rahman, 1985; Bergek & Norrman, 2008; Chan & Lau, 2005). 
While entrepreneurial financing literature focuses on explaining impacts and effects of external 
investors (e.g., individual angels, venture capitalists, and corporate venture capitalists, etc) on 
startups’ performance and future (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Bertoni, Colombo, & Grilli, 2011; 
Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006),the emergence of accelerators fills the void between stage 1 
and stage 2 because they serve nascent entrepreneurs as a professional school, providing them 
nessary training sessions to accelerate their formulation process and also playing a role as the 
first external investor to provide a small amount of seed capital to help these competent 
entrepreneurs release their positve signals to other investors and attract funds.  
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2.3 Dual-Role Model of Accelerators  
As the “bridge” helps startups increase their survival chances from stage 1 to stage 2, 
accelerators need to have this “dual-role” feature (being the “educator” and “investor” 
simultaneously) in their design. While the educator role focuses on enhancing startups’ market 
competencies, the investor role focuses on enhancing their fundraising capability to scale up.  
Educator Role: This role derives from incubator models that provide entrepreneurs or 
startups necessary support, such as mentorship, bootcamps, business model training sessions, as 
well as network support. One mission of the accelerator is to enhance entrepreneurs’ 
competencies and prepare these potential but “not-ready-yet” startups to be ready for their next 
stage.  
Investor role. Accelerators also need to undertake the investor role. They provide 
training opportunities and resources to these selected startups or entrepreneurial teams, and then 
they will be the first angel investor in their portfolio startups. Generally, the seed money 
provided by accelerators ranges from $20,000 to $100,000.  
One key note is that institutions need to meet this “dual-role” criteria to be qualified as 
accelerators. If they only have one role, they then fall into either the incubator-alike model or the 
investor-alike model. To be qualified as an accelerator, they need to have these operational 
features from both roles. In other words, accelerators should function as a combination of both 
the incubator model and the venture capital model.  
This “dual-role” feature cannot differentiate accelerators from other similar institutions, 
but it can explain the within-group heterogeneity across different accelerator programs. 
Simultaneously possessing both roles does not mean that all accelerators must place equal focus 
or preference on each role. According to their missions, goals, and design logics, accelerators 
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have different preferences within this “dual-role” scale (e.g, some accelerators might choose to 
be “20% educator plus 80% investor,” while others might choose to be “50% educator plus 50% 
investor.” Accelerators’ different focuses and preferences within their “dual-role” lead to this 
cross-program heterogeneity.  
The question is, why do some accelerators choose to be “20% educator plus 80% 
investor” while others choose to be “50% educator plus 50% investor”? I propose that this choice 
is influenced by another two design features of accelerators: 1) for-profit vs. non-for-profit and 
2) equity-taken vs. non-equity-taken 
Based on these two features, I have developed this 2x2table to illustrate how accelerators’ 
preferences on “dual-role” will be embodied by the interactions of these two design features.  
In Figure 2, we can categorize our known accelerators into four boxes according to 
whether they take equity from startups and whether they are for-profit organizations.  
Accelerators that fall into the first box are non-for-profit accelerators that do not take 
equity from their cohort startups. On their dual-role continuum, these accelerators focus 
primarily on its educational goals. Most government-based accelerators and university-based 
accelerators fit in this category. They have relatively stable and secure funding sources from the 
government or their corporate partnership, which provide grants or awards to winning teams on 
Demo-Day. The Mass Challenge and the StartX are two examples of this type. 
Accelerators that fall into the third box are for-profit accelerators who take equity from 
their startups. Apparently, these accelerators focus more on their investor role than the educator 
role. The reason that they provide intensive training sessions and other services to startups is to 
accelerate the startups venture creation process. They can only make revenue out of it when 
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startups exit either through acquisition or through IPO. Almost all these well-known seed 
accelerators belong to this category, such as Y-combinator, TechStar, and 500 Startups.  
A third type of accelerators are non-for-profit but also seek for equity exchange, which 
falls into the second box. Since part of their revenue is from their fund providers, and part of 
their income is from startups’ exit performance, they have a more balanced educator and investor 
role. For example, University of Chicago New Venture Challenge falls into this category.  
Since I have not found any existing accelerator that is for-profit but not seeking equity 
exchange, I will leave this category blank for now. But I predict that perhaps in the future, there 
might be some new form of accelerators adopting innovative business models to be profit-driven 
without seeking equity exchange from their accelerated startups.  
Prior literature mentions the difficulty of accurately evaluating the efficacy of accelerator 
is due to their newness and their heterogeneity. Given the complexity of accelerators’ 
phenomenon, it is important to distinguish them more specifically in terms of their preferences 
on their dual-role choice, especially regarding the comparison among different programs. It will 
be considered as unfair if we evaluate type I, II and III accelerators based on the same criteria. 
For these investor-role driven accelerators who are seeking equity exchange, their performance 
will directly depend on their cohort startups exit performance, such as the proportion of cohort 
startups successfully exiting and realizing potential value. For equity-exchange accelerators, their 
investment can only generate returns when their cohort startups realize their valuation by being 
acquired or going IPO. Therefore, the exit speed and exit valuation weigh much more than other 
performance indicators like the scale of alumni startups or the surviving rate of startups. 
Counterintuitively, these accelerators might be afraid of seeing “surviving but without any 
growing or exit potential” startups in their portfolio.  The number of startups they accelerated, 
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the surviving rate of these startups, or how many jobs  are created by their startups, are not their 
concern. However, it will be more important for those non-for-profit accelerators to measure 
their impact in a broader sense rather than focusing on financial return. For example, 
MassChallenge is a well-known non-profit accelerator that is supported by the government. It 
receives funding from global partnerships with big corporate foundations such as JP Morgan 
Chase Foundation and IBM, etc1. Since it is “designed to help startups win,” it identifies itself as 
“startup-friendly” and does not take any equity from startups. In Mass Challenge’s recently 
published impact report, they clearly mentioned that they “…passed a milestone of accelerating 
over 1,000 startups—1,211 in total. Our alums have raised over $1.8 billion in funding, 
generated over $700 million in revenue, and created 60,000 direct and indirect jobs.” Apparently, 
those non-for-profit accelerators put more attention on the scale of cohort startups, the amount of 
jobs created directly and indirectly, and cohort startups revenue and survival rate.  
To summarize, Figure 3 demonstrates the integrated conceptual map to differentiate 
accelerator from other similar institutions and explains the internal heterogeneity across 
accelerator programs.  
Thus, extending Cohen’s definition of accelerator through the Entrepreneurial Venture 
Creation theoretical lens, I redefine the accelerator as:  
A fixed term, cohort-based program aiming at enhancing startups’ competency. Besides 
receiving mentorship and education, selected teams (in for-profit accelerators) or winning teams 
in a public pitch event or demo-day (in non-for-profit accelerators) will receive a small amount 
of seed capital. 
                                                        
1 http://boston.masschallenge.org/faqs 
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Compared with Cohen’s definition, this revised definition emphasizes the dual-role 
accelerators undertake to help early-stage startups and also mentions two critical features that 
will influence accelerators’ choices on their preference of the “dual-role.” I agree that some of 
them might focus more on their educational role (Mass Challenge, StartX., etc) while others 
focus more on their investor role (Y combinator, and TechStars., etc), but a rigorously designed 
accelerator program should fulfill both roles at the same time. To be identified as “accelerators” 
they need to undertake both roles. The within-group differences will be embodied through their 
balance of deciding which role and to what degree this role should be emphasized in their 
operational models. (As Figure 3 showed below)  
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CHAPTER 3 WHERE DO DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACCELERATORS FIT IN 
VENTURE CREATION PIPELINE 
On the basis of Entrepreneurship Venture Creation Theory, I proposed the “dual-role” 
model of the accelerators and update its general definition in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will 
specifically focus on the position of each type of accelerators, and conceptually discuss their 
unique values to the entrepreneurship ecosystem and their accelerated startups.  
First, I will introduce startup ecosystem in general, and its three interrelated subsystems. 
Then I will apply the Pipeline Model (Lichtenstein & Lyons, 2006) to explain how different 
types of accelerators are designed specifically to help early-stage startups with distinctive needs.  
3.1 Startup Ecosystem  
 Startups are an important means by which new ideas are brought to life-especially those 
ideas that challenge established industries or do not find ready support inside existing companies. 
They are core to the process of creative destruction and crucial for increasing employment. They 
exert competitive pressure on prevailing businesses, which drives improvements in productivity 
and prosperity. In short, the starting-scaling of new ventures is vital for innovation and economic 
growth. However, due to the “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965), startups are also 
fragile, vulnerable and associated with extremely high risks of failing when they explore and 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 An entrepreneurship ecosystem is defined as “an interconnected group of factors in a 
local geographic community committed to sustainable development through the support and 
facilitation of new sustainable ventures” (Cohen, 2006, p. 3). Scholars who hold this view 
propose that building a strong, mature and sustainable entrepreneurship ecosystem is crucial for 
economic development, because it can effectively help startups overcome the “liability of 
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newness” to survive and scale (e.g., Cohen, 2006; Feldman, 2001; Lichtenstein, Lyons, & 
Kutzhanova, 2004; Mack & Mayer, 2016; Neck, Meyer, Cohen, & Corbett, 2004). This 
supportive environment view was also referred to as an “enterprise development strategy” by  
Koven and Lyons (2003), which is “…assistance to entrepreneurs in support of the creation, 
growth and survival of their businesses. (p. 100)” Extant research has identified a wide range of 
elements in the entrepreneurship ecosystem that have direct or indirect influences on new 
venture creation. For example, system components listed by Cohen (2006) include informal 
network, formal network, university, government, professional and support services, capital 
services, and talent pool. Focusing on high-tech entrepreneurial activities, Neck et al (2004) 
examined elements including incubator organizations, spin-offs, informal and formal networks, 
physical infrastructure and the culture.  
To integrate and organize these distinct elements in a more united manner, Spigel (2015) 
identified three meta-types of ecosystem attributes: cultural, social and material, and he listed 
specific components under each one. For example, supportive culture and histories of 
entrepreneurs belong to the cultural dimension; work talents, investment capital, networks, and 
mentors and role models belong to the social dimension; and policy and governance, universities, 
support services, physical infrastructure and open markets belong to the material dimension. 
From the community developmental perspective,  Lichtenstein and Lyons (2001) focus on 
entities that are called “service/assistance providers” (Lichtenstein & Lyons, 2001), or “venture 
development organizations” (VDOs) (Plummer, Allison, & Connelly, 2016). These include but, 
are not limited to, youth entrepreneurship programs, microenterprise programs, business 
incubators, manufacturing networks, entrepreneurship networks, small business development 
 
 
 23 
centers, angel capital networks, venture capital clubs and funds, revolving loan funds, SCORE 
chapters, and technology transfer programs, among others. 
 However, while simply listing or grouping these elements might help entrepreneurs 
understand what services these providers offer, how they function, and how the ecosystem 
operates, these lists do not help entrepreneurs better understand who they should come to for 
resource help, when they are at different stages of venture development. In this Chapter, I will 
first explain three main subsystems: supporting subsystem, financing subsystem and incubation 
subsystem. Then I will map these three subsystems by applying the Pipeline Model and illustrate 
how the main elements in these subsystems function consecutively to help 
entrepreneurs/ventures at different stages to move through the pipeline.  
3.1.1 The Supporting Subsystem 
 A startup support subsystem comprises a variety of firms and organizations that provide 
ancillary services to new ventures (Spigel, 2015), like startup programs, industry 
associations/networks, legal services, accounting services, technical experts/mentors, and 
crediting agencies (Cohen, 2006; Kenney & Patton, 2005; Patton & Kenney, 2005). Two 
important features of organizations in this subsystem are: 1) they provide a variety of external 
services to startups, and they charge startups service fees, depending on the amount and the 
quality of services they provide; and 2) different service providers have a different service scope 
for new ventures. Some of these service providers only target early-stage startups, while others 
might focus on helping late-stage ventures. A few of them might provide a wide range of 
services through the entire life cycle of ventures. It is relatively easy to identify service providers 
based on their functions (e.g., legal advices, tax advices., etc), but it might be confusing when a 
diversity of startup programs emerges to provide services for nascent entrepreneurs at pre-
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venture phases, such as entrepreneurship courses, startup weekends, co-working spaces, 
competitions (Dee et al., 2015).  
3.1.2 The Finance Subsystem 
 Startup finance subsystems provide external financial capital for startups at different 
stages and include a variety of financiers such as banks, private equity investors, venture 
capitalists, angel investors, foundations, microfinance institutions, public capital markets, 
development finance institutions, and crowdfunders (Bruton, Khavul, Siegel, & Wright, 2015; 
Cohen, 2006; Lichtenstein et al., 2004; Lichtenstein & Lyons, 2006; Motoyama & Knowlton, 
2016; Spiegel, 2015). In general, there are two general types of financiers in this subsystem: debt 
financiers and equity financiers (Bussgang, 2014). Donors are a third type of financier, but 
because they have special expectations for their beneficiaries, I will not specifically discuss them 
in this paper. All ventures need financial capital to operate and survive, but not all financing 
tools are designed for early-stage startups. Debt financiers do not provide risk-adjusted capital, 
and they expect startups to have stable and predictable incomes so that they can pay their debts 
with minimum risk. So most debt financiers target late-stage startups, and so do institutional 
investors, who are purely growth-oriented. Some equity investors have higher risk tolerance, and 
they are willing to provide equity capital to startups that are still at a very early stage, for 
example, angel investors and venture capitalists. Similar to organizations in the support 
subsystem, players in the financing subsystem provide external financial resources to startups as 
well as services such as mentoring. 
3.1.3 The Incubation Subsystem  
 Besides these external resource providers, entities in the incubation subsystem provide 
internal resources to their client ventures. This group includes a variety of organizations such as 
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science parks, technology incubators, innovation centers and labs, and accelerators (Mian, 
Lamine, & Fayolle, 2016). Here I only focus on differentiating accelerators from incubators.  
3.1.3.1 Incubators.  
 Incubators are property-based initiatives (Phan, Siegel, & Wright, 2005) providing their 
tenants with a mix of services encompassing infrastructure, business support services and 
networking (Bergek & Norrman, 2008; Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, & Sull, 2000; Lalkaka & 
Bishop, 1996). Unlike supporting systems and financing systems, which provide external 
assistance for startups, the incubation system was created to provide direct and internal 
assistance for young ventures. This system emerged in 1959 in New York, with the provision of 
affordable office space as its main services (Bergek & Norrman, 2008); then it became a popular 
tool in the 1980s to promote the creation of new technology-intensive companies (Lewis, 2001); 
and now it has evolved to be more network-focused (Scillitoe & Chakrabarti, 2010). In general, 
incubator institutions focus on assisting their client companies to improve their competency. 
General operational features include a not-for-profit structure, low-cost working space provision, 
flexible tenancy, and no financial investment in their client ventures (Allen & McCluskey, 1990; 
Hackett & Dilts, 2004).  
3.1.3.2 Accelerators.  
 As an emerging incubation-like model, accelerators are created with features of both the 
incubation subsystem and the financing subsystem. Like incubators, accelerators help startups 
refine their ideas, build initial prototypes, identify promising customer segments, and provide 
networking opportunities to external investors and industry experts. But distinct from the 
traditional incubation models that are equity-free and charge their clients a space rental fee, 
accelerator programs provide small amounts of seed capital - $26k on average, with a range from 
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$0 to $150k (Hochberg, 2016) - to their selected startups in exchange for equity (typically 5% – 
7%) with the purpose of “accelerating” venture development. Since accelerators only recruit 
startups once or twice in each year, the selection rate of accelerators is extremely low and they 
only consider “cohort classes” of startups. 
Although I can identify these three subsystems in the entrepreneurship ecosystem, 
challenges regarding how to build up a strong entrepreneurship ecosystem remain. As  
Lichtenstein et al., (2004) pointed out, activities provided by different service providers are 
fragmented and categorical, because service providers tend to function in isolation of one 
another, and this isolation is reinforced by the fact that each provider has its own culture, jargon, 
operating practices, professional associations, performance standards, and funding streams. 
Therefore, only highly experienced and skilled entrepreneurs are able to integrate and navigate 
all these services smoothly. However, a vibrant entrepreneurship ecosystem not only includes 
high-skilled entrepreneurs, but also includes “rookies” who have just started their entrepreneurial 
journey. Most of the time, “rookies” look at these offerings as a maze, with no entry point and no 
clear exit (Lichtenstein et al., 2004). 
3.2 The Pipeline Model  
Lichtenstein and Lyons proposed the Entrepreneurial Development System (EDS) in  
2001. They argue that to build up a sustainable entrepreneurship ecosystem/community, the key 
activity needed is to build up a cohesive and holistic development system for entrepreneurs that 
transforms them from “rookies” to “major leaguers” in terms of their skills. Four unique skills 
were identified: 1) technical skills: ability to perform the key operations of that business; 2) 
managerial skills: ability to organize and efficiently manage the operations; 3) entrepreneurial 
skills: ability to identify market opportunities and create solutions that capture those 
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opportunities, and 4) personal maturity: self-awareness, willingness and ability to accept 
responsibility, emotional development and creative ability. Based on different levels of each skill 
possessed by entrepreneurs, they can be placed into five categories: rookies, single A, Double A, 
Triple A, and Major Leaguers, following the league system of American baseball. In addition, 
Lichtenstein and Lyons (2001) provide another guideline to help different service providers to be 
integrated into a holistic system, in which each provider can concentrate on what it does best and 
serve a particular entrepreneurial need at an appropriate level of development. Table 2 
summarizes the entrepreneurial development level of different enterprise development assistance 
providers. It must be noted that the original EDS framework broadly views all players in the 
supporting system, incubation system and financing system as service providers, without 
distinguishing the different value added to young ventures at different developmental stages.  
Following the EDS,  Lichtenstein and Lyons (2006) operationalize the concept of a 
pipeline of entrepreneurs and enterprises (Pipeline Model) from a community economic 
development perspective by capturing both dimensions of entrepreneurial skill level and 
enterprise life cycle stage level. They state, “These two variables can be used to map the 
community’s pipeline of entrepreneurs and enterprises, giving us a new set of lenses that enable 
us to shift from seeing an undifferentiated pool to seeing a pipeline consisting of variegated 
stocks and flows.” (2006, p. 379). 
 This model incorporates three basic assumptions: 1) entrepreneurs are successful to the 
extent that they have the necessary skills, 2) entrepreneurs come to entrepreneurship at different 
levels of skill, and 3) entrepreneurial skills can be developed and refined. This skill variable can 
help us to differentiate an entrepreneur’s “readiness” by analyzing their different skill sets. The 
other important variable identified by the Pipeline Model is the life cycle stage of the venture. 
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Using business life cycle theory, Lichtenstein and Lyons (2006) identify six consecutive stages 
for all ventures, from Stage 0 (Pre-Venture) to Stage 5 (Decline). Here I apply and extend the 
Pipeline Model to map players situated in these three subsystems, who aim at assisting 
entrepreneurs and ventures at early stages, from the Pre-venture (stage 0), Existence or Infancy 
(stage 1), to Early Growth (stage 2). Table 3 provides the definitions of each stage.  
To capture nuanced differences in terms of added value provided by different service 
providers at early stages of startup, I follow Rotefoss and Kolvereid (2005) to identify two sub-
phases within Stage 0, depending on the degree that entrepreneurs get involved in entrepreneurial 
activities. They are:  
1) the aspiration phase—the potential entrepreneur shows his/her propensity to start a 
business. In this stage, most individuals have intention to become entrepreneurs, and they might 
have several entrepreneurial ideas, but they do not really get involved in any entrepreneurial 
activities; and  
2) the preparation phase—it also is called the “nascent stage”, in which sense making of 
information acquired during the attempt to assemble resources and actualize ideas takes place. 
During this stage, nascent entrepreneurs might talk with people about their ideas to evaluate their 
desirability and feasibility and start to discover the business model.  
Figure 4 demonstrates how these different service/finance providers in each subsystem 
help entrepreneurs and their ventures to develop along the pipeline from the pre-venture stage 
and the early growth stage. I first follow Lichtenstein and Lyons (2006) and plot “entrepreneurial 
skills” on the y-axis and “stages” on the X-axis. Because I only focus on differentiating 
service/finance providers for early-stage startups, I only identify three stages on the X-axis. 
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There are two important implications of this map: 1) the incubation subsystem functions 
as the bridge, providing internal assistance to AA entrepreneurs, so that they can transform to the 
AAA level and move their ventures forward; and 2) although both incubators and accelerators 
belong to the incubation subsystem, their targeted clients are still slightly different in terms of 
their developmental levels. As Cohen and Hochberg (2014, p. 9) articulate, “philosophically, 
incubators are designed to nurture nascent ventures by buffering them from the environment, 
providing them room to grow in a space sheltered from market forces. Accelerators, in contrast, 
are designed to speed up market interactions in order to help nascent ventures adapt quickly and 
learn.”  
In the next section, I will focus on accelerators, and explain how different types of 
accelerators should be placed on this pipeline map.  
3.3 Distinctive Types of Accelerators and Expected Outcomes  
“Accelerator” is an umbrella term that includes many different formats, such as corporate 
accelerators (e.g., Kanbach & Stubner, 2016; Kohler, 2016; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015), 
private for-profit accelerators (e.g., Hallen, Bingham, & Cohen, 2014b), social impact 
accelerators (e.g., Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2017), and university-based accelerators (e.g., 
Mason & Brown, 2014; Wise & Valliere, 2014). After conceptually discussing their common 
functional features and the general benefits entrepreneurs can expect from them, scholars 
(Hochberg, 2016; Mason & Brown, 2014) point out that each type of accelerator operates 
following its own goals, design logics, and innate motivations. Therefore, they function 
differently by providing different services and contributing to the entrepreneurial ecosystem in 
different ways (Goswami, Mitchell, & Bhagavatula, 2018).  
 
 
 30 
To better understand their commonalities and divergences, Pauwels and his colleagues   
(2016) conducted semi-structured interviews with the managing directors of 13 accelerators in 
Europe, and their findings suggest that all of these 13 accelerators’ activity systems contain five 
design elements—program package, strategic focus, selection process, funding structure, and 
alumni relations. By examining details of these five design elements, they identified three main 
design themes of accelerators. These are: 1) the ecosystem builder, which primarily matches 
customers with startups and builds the corporate ecosystem (e.g. corporate accelerators), 2) the 
deal-flow maker, which focuses on identifying investment opportunities for investors (e.g. 
private startup accelerators), and 3) the welfare stimulator, which focuses on promoting startups 
and economic development (e.g., government-driven accelerators or university-based 
accelerators). However, they did not specify whether these three main types of accelerators seek 
to accelerate all early-stage ventures or have their own particular implicit preferences for 
ventures at a given stage of development.  
Following their study, I propose that these three main types of accelerators have different 
focuses in terms of “whom” will be developed (entrepreneurs, ventures or both). Therefore, from 
the developmental perspective, participating in different types of accelerators might lead to 
different developmental effects on entrepreneurs and their ventures.  
3.3.1 Deal-flow Makers 
 Funded by equity investors such as business angels, venture capital funds or corporate 
venture capital, deal-flow makers are primarily driven to identify promising investment 
opportunities for investors. Their selection logic is to “pick the winners”, which are eligible for 
follow-on capital and have the ability to evolve into attractive investment propositions quickly 
(Pauwels et al., 2016). Hence, these deal-flow makers tend to focus on relatively later-stage 
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startups that already have some proven track record. Many profit-driven standalone business 
accelerators belong to this type, for instance Y-combinator, TechStars, and 500 startups.  
When I place deal-flow makers in the pipeline model, we can expect that the goals of 
these for-profit seed accelerators will most likely be venture-centered, focusing on venture 
development. They are not very interested in spending their energies, resources and time to 
develop or transform entrepreneurs to the next level; therefore, the expected outcome of 
participating or being selected by this type of accelerator is horizontal movement along the Y-
axis. 
3.3.2 Welfare Stimulators 
According to Pauwels et al (2016), this type of accelerator typically has a government 
agency as a principal stakeholder. Similarly, non-profit driven university business accelerators 
(UBAs) also belong to this category. Unlike deal-flow makers, the primary objective of this 
accelerator type is to stimulate startup activity and foster economic growth. Because they 
typically select ventures in a very early-stage, even when a value proposition has not been fully 
developed, the education components of their services (e.g., curricula and training programs) are 
the most developed among all three types of accelerators.  
When we place welfare stimulators in the pipeline model, we can expect that the goals of 
these for-profit seed accelerators will most likely be entrepreneur-centered, focusing on 
developing entrepreneurs’ skills and strengthening the “supply side” of entrepreneurs in the 
regional entrepreneurship ecosystem. Because they are not commercialization-oriented, the 
expected outcome of participating or being selected by this type of accelerator is vertical 
movement along the X-axis. 
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3.3.3 Ecosystem Builders  
 Typically, this type of accelerator is established by large and existing companies for their 
own strategic reasons, for instance, gaining an understanding of current market developments 
and trends; further development and integration of the products and services from the startups; or 
evaluating innovative products and services that have the potential to be disruptive (Kanbach & 
Stubner, 2016). In general, parent companies want to develop an ecosystem of customers and 
stakeholders around their companies. This type of accelerator does not take fees or equity from 
their selected startups, but only those startups that are perceived to have the ability to contribute 
to corporate ecosystem development will have the opportunity to be selected (Pauwels et al., 
2016).  
Large companies have two kinds of expectations from their accelerated startups. First, 
they want to develop entrepreneurs by providing experiential learning opportunities, so that even 
if their new startups do not survive or become successful, these developed entrepreneurs might 
become potential employees in the company. Second, if these startups become successful, their 
frequent engagement in symbolic actions such as broadcasting, newsletters, and showcase 
events, will not only improve their own perceived legitimacy (Zott & Huy, 2007) but also 
strengthen the parent company’s portfolio. Therefore, if we place ecosystem builders in the 
pipeline model, the expected outcomes would be different from either those of deal-flow makers 
or those of welfare stimulators. Compared with the other two types, the expected outcome of 
participating in or being selected by this type of accelerator should be movement toward the 
upper right-hand corner.  
In Figure 5, I plotted these three types of accelerators in the pipeline model. The 
rectangular boxes represent where each of these three types of accelerators fit in the model, 
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which also reflect their different selection logics and the variation in the startups they target. 
Following Pauwels et al’s (2016) findings, I propose that welfare stimulators target 
comparatively lower-skilled entrepreneurs and earlier-stage startups, while deal-flow makers 
target higher-skilled entrepreneurs and later-stage startups. Then I use oval boxes to indicate the 
expected outcomes for these three types of accelerators. What I demonstrate is that while welfare 
stimulators aim to develop entrepreneurs, deal-flow makers aim to transform startups, and 
ecosystem builders expect to accomplish both.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE SELECTION OF SOCIAL IMPACT ACCELERATOR 
As I mentioned in Introduction, the development of each type of accelerators is 
imbalanced such as private for-profit accelerators and corporate accelerators have attracted 
relatively more attentions, leaving social impact accelerators (SIAs) and university-based 
accelerators unexamined (e.g., Kohler, 2016; Kanbach & Stubner, 2016; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 
2015; Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2017).  In Chapter 4, I will focus on SIAs and empirically 
examine their selection results.  
4.1 Introduction 
Given the resource-poor condition of most entrepreneurs, startups often require external 
resources in order to survive and grow (Aldrich, 1999), especially social startups. Unfortunately, 
because startup accelerators emerged to support entrepreneurs in technologically-intensive 
industries (e.g., Hallen et al., 2014b), the needs of social entrepreneurs seeking early-stage 
support initially remained largely unaddressed (Lall et al., 2013). Yet, the rapid growth of 
startups operating in the social sector has spurred the recent development of a new type of 
accelerator – the social impact accelerator (SIA). Modeled closely after traditional accelerators 
(e.g., Y Combinator, Techstars, 500 startups), SIAs (e.g., Echoing Green, Startup Chile) are 
designed specifically to support early stage startups seeking to pioneer, validate, and scale new 
and unproven business models intended to generate meaningful social and/or environmental 
impact alongside positive financial returns (Lall et al., 2013). 
As I identified in Chapter 2, research on SIAs is still nascent and, as a result, how they 
make cohort admission decisions is largely unknown. Due to the legitimacy ascribed to startups 
receiving accelerator support (Block et al., 2017), coupled with the importance of selection 
decisions on the efficacy of the acceleration process,  Drover, Busenitz, et al., (2017) call for 
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future research on the decision processes surrounding SIA cohort selection. In responding to this 
call, I acknowledge that most entrepreneurship research that has investigated selection decisions 
has relied on signaling theory and has focused on traditional investors, such as angels (e.g., 
Prasad, Bruton, & Vozikis, 2000), venture capitalists (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004; Busenitz, 
Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Plummer et al., 2016), and banks (e.g., Eddleston, Ladge, Mitteness, & 
Balachandra, 2016), that tend to invest based purely on economic signals communicating a 
venture’s ability to generate financial returns.  
More recently, however, scholars have begun to examine the investment decisions of 
non-traditional investors, such as microlenders and crowdfunders, that tend to base their 
decisions on signals communicating a venture’s potential for social impact (e.g., Greenberg & 
Mollick, 2017; Johnson, Stevenson, & Letwin, 2018; Lee & Huang, 2018; Moss, Renko, Block, 
& Meyskens, 2018). Taken together, these streams of reseach suggest that economic and social 
signals can each serve to legitimate a startup in the selection process. At the same time, because 
they have focused on either economic signals in masculine settings or social signals in feminine 
settings, it is difficult to surmise the extent to which these signals will matter in hybrid settings. 
By extending this line of inquiry into the context of SIAs, which emphasize financial success and 
social impact, I hope to understand whether and to what degree economic and social signals 
impact selection decisions when considered concurrently.  
While I expect social startups seeking acceptance into SIAs to benefit from 
communicating both their economic and social credibility, I also acknowledge that in order for 
signals to be effective, they must be interpreted as intended, without bias (Park & Mezias, 2005). 
One form of bias that has received a great deal of attention in the entrepreneurial financing 
literature is gender (e.g., Brush, Carter, Gatewood, Greene, & Hart, 2001; Carter, Shaw, Lam, & 
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Wilson, 2007; Constantinidis, Cornet, & Asandei, 2006; Eddleston et al., 2016; Malmström, 
Johansson, & Wincent, 2017; Marlow & Patton, 2005). For example, scholars have found that 
external resource providers exhibit bias toward female entrepreneurs by charging them higher 
interest rates (e.g., Fraser, 2005; Wu & Chua, 2012), asking them to disclose more information 
before providing them with financing (e.g., Constantinidis et al., 2006; Murphy, Kickul, Barbosa, 
& Titus, 2007), providing them with smaller loans (Eddleston et al., 2016), and investing 
significantly less venture capital in their ventures (e.g., Kanze, Huang, Conley, & Higgins, 2018; 
Malmström et al., 2017) as compared to their male counterparts. As a result of this bias, female 
entrepreneurs have been found to be less likely than male entrepreneurs to utilize formal, 
external sources of financing during the startup phase (e.g., Coleman, 2000; Coleman & Robb, 
2012), to use debt financing to finance ongoing operations (Sara & Peter, 1998), to be funded by 
angels (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007) and venture capitalists (P. G. Greene, Brush, Hart, & 
Saparito, 2001), and to issue an IPO (Nelson & Levesque, 2007). 
As one possible explanation for these findings, Eddleston et al (2016, p. 490) argue, from 
the perspective of gender role congruity theory (GRCT) (Eagly & Karau, 2002), that “gender 
affects the degree to which women versus men benefit from positive signals.” Based on a study 
of 201 small businesses, they find that banks invest less money in female entrepreneurs than 
male entrepreneurs even when they send the same signals about their ventures. While 
provocative, I suspect that Eddleston et al.’s (2016) results might be influenced, at least in part, 
by their empirical context. Because they focus on commercial entrepreneurs seeking bank loans, 
it is perhaps no surprise that masculine traits were found to dominate financing decisions. Given 
the prevalence of such an approach in studies focusing on entrepreneurship and gender, Jennings 
and Brush (2013, p. 686) question “whether male entrepreneurs operating in stereotypically 
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feminine industries experience subtle or even overt forms of discrimination by resource 
providers.” In response, a small but growing stream of research has begun to examine such 
contexts and highlight certain conditions that challenge the conventional understanding of gender 
bias by identifying situations in which women may not always be at a disadvantage. For 
example, recent research on entrepreneurship across the globe finds that female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to pursue social missions (e.g., Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; Hechavarria, Ingram, 
Justo, & Terjesen, 2012; Meyskens, Elaine Allen, & Brush, 2011) and, perhaps as a result, attract 
more crowdfunding than men (e.g., Greenberg & Mollick, 2017) due to the perception that they 
are more trustworthy (Johnson et al., 2018). Similarly, Lee and Huang ( 2018) find evidence to 
suggest that the female entrepreneurs can reduce the gender penalty by emphasizing the social 
and environmental welfare benefits of their ventures.  
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution this stream of research makes by highlighting 
the possibility that women may not just be less disadvantaged than men but may actually be at an 
advantage compared to men, its focus on setting with only feminine attributes ignores the 
complementary role masculine factors might also play in the decision to support a social startup. 
My focus on SIAs responds more comprehensively to Jennings and Brush’s (2013) call by 
examining whether or not the gender advantages men have been found to enjoy will hold in a 
context in which both masculine and feminine attributes ought to be relevant. In so doing, I see 
an opportunity to build upon research in this area by proposing that gender bias can have positive 
and negative effects on both men and women. Drawing on GRCT, I hypothesize that the gender 
effect is subject to the nature of the signal being sent by the entrepreneur, such that both men and 
women will experience advantages (and disadvantages) based on the congruity (or incongruity) 
of their gender with the signals they send about their startups.  
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Examining 2,324 startups that applied to a global network of 123 SIAs, I find that while 
both economic and social signals are positively associated with SIAs’ selection decisions, gender 
stereotypes do seem to play an important role in how these signals are interpreted. Specifically, I 
find that the positive effects signals conveying economic and social credibility have on SIA 
selection decisions are magnified when they are congruent with gender roles ascribed to the lead 
entrepreneur. When these signals are incongruent with gender stereotypes, however, SIAs tend to 
either discount (for those with male founders) or, worse yet, penalize (for those with female 
founders) social startups in their selection decisions. The finding that, in the hybrid context of 
social entrepreneurship, where both agentic and communal traits are valued, female 
entrepreneurs are not necessarily at a disadvantage to male entrepreneurs, as most prior studies 
have concluded (e.g., Eddleston et al., 2016; Jennings & Brush, 2013; Malmström et al., 2017; 
Wilson, Carter, Tagg, Shaw, & Lam, 2007), but may actually obtain better outcomes from 
gender and signal congruity, supports a growing stream of research that has found similar silver 
lining effects (e.g., Greenberg & Mollick, 2017; Johnson et al., 2018; Lee & Huang, 2018) and 
suggests that signals may be best understood as a function of the broader context in which they 
are communicated. Simultaneously, despite these findings, this research shows that gender role 
congruity seems to favor men more than women and I provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the complex and uneven role gendered mental models may play in the signaling process.  
Signaling theory, in essence, is based on the completeness of the information at hand; the 
more complete the information, the more informed decisions the receiver can make. However, in 
line with Drover, Wood, et al., (2017), our findings show that the additional information 
provided by gender actually triggers problems of signal interpretation and asymmetries grow 
wider particularly when that additional information seems incongruent with gender stereotypes. 
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Although SIAs tend to accept more female-led social startups on average, they nevertheless seem 
to still exhibit a stronger bias against them under incongruity. As a result, I suspect SIAs are 
missing out on supporting social startups with great potential for economic and social returns. 
4.2 Social Impact Accelerators 
By seeking to pursue a social mission through a business structure (Smith, Gonin, & 
Besharov, 2013), social startups are inherently saddled with two competing logics: a social 
welfare/Communal logic, which emphasizes improving social and/or environmental conditions, 
and a commercial/Darwinian logic, which stresses profit, efficiency, and operational 
effectiveness (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012; Besharov & 
Smith, 2014; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011). Because each logic is supported by distinct goals, 
values, norms, and identities, their integration into one organizational entity (e.g., a Hybrid 
orientation; Fauchart and Gruber, 2011) often creates a “performing tension” as the organization 
strives to address the competing demands of its multiple, divergent stakeholders (Smith & Lewis, 
2011). Specifically, given the broad range of a social startup’s stakeholders (Grimes, 2010; 
Haigh & Hoffman, 2012; Hanleybrown, Kania, & Kramer, 2012), satisfying the demands of any 
one particular group has been found to be exceedingly difficult given that serving one (e.g., 
beneficiaries) might detract from the interests of another (e.g., external investors) (Tracey & 
Jarvis, 2007). For example, Jay’s (2013) analysis of the Cambridge Energy Alliance shows how 
outcomes that support the organization’s social mission simultaneously undermine its financial 
goals, and vice versa. Similarly, Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis (2011) show how efforts to expand 
social impact at Aspire, a work integration organization, ultimately led to financial failure. These 
examples suggest that although social startups have been argued on theoretical grounds to be 
ideally suited to solving traditional market failures, increasing social welfare, and bringing about 
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positive social change (e.g., Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Mair & Marti, 2006), empirical 
evidence of their ability to do so in a financially sustainable fashion is equivocal. 
Given the challenges social startups face, they often seek the support of accelerators in 
order to help them develop and refine sustainable business models that can generate positive 
social/environmental and financial returns in their early years. As a relatively new form of 
startup assistance organization, startup accelerators are designed to help emerging ventures of all 
kinds define their ideas, build initial prototypes, identify promising customer segments, build 
relationships with external investors and industry experts, etc., all in a compressed time frame. 
Startup accelerators help meet these needs by providing a variety of means of support, including 
but not limited to networking, business training, mentoring, access to capital, and office space 
(Cohen, 2013). While most prominent accelerators (e.g., Y Combinator, Techstars, 500 Startups) 
are for-profit and target high-growth startups in the technology sector, a new type of accelerator, 
the SIA (e.g., Echoing Green, Startup Chile, etc.), has emerged in response to the growing 
number of startups seeking to serve a social purpose while earning a profit (e.g., European 
Investment Fund, 2017).  
In addition to the legitimacy benefits startups receiving SIA support enjoy (Block et al., 
2017), SIAs also provide tangible support for social startups. According to a 2012 report from 
Monitor-Deloitte and the Acumen Fund (Kohl et al., 2012), a “pioneer gap” separates the 
thousands of early-stage social entrepreneurs seeking to launch companies that can drive social 
change worldwide from the resources needed to build teams, the customer bases they intend to 
serve, and/or the financial capital necessary to achieve scale. Similar to the success traditional 
accelerators have played in jumpstarting high-growth technology ventures, Lall et al. (2013) 
argue that SIAs are a powerful force in bridging this pioneer gap and will, therefore, continue to 
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proliferate in the coming years. As evidence, even traditional accelerators such as Y Combinator 
and Techstars have recently launched SIA initiatives to begin supporting social startups (Shieber, 
2017). 
Unfortunately, despite the important role SIAs have begun to play in the social sector, 
very little research has been conducted on them. As such,  Drover, Busenitz, et al., (2017) argue 
that a better understanding of the decision processes surrounding SIA cohort selection can 
provide insight into the efficacy of the acceleration process. In responding to this call, I 
recognize that most entrepreneurship research focusing on selection decisions has relied on 
signaling theory (Rawhouser, Villanueva, & Newbert, 2017) and, therefore, use it as a 
foundation in the development of the conceptual model. At the same time, I note a 
complementary stream of research that highlight the under-specification of signaling theory as it 
does not account for the possibility that signals might not be received as intended (Alsos & 
Ljunggren, 2017; Eddleston et al., 2016; Lee and Huang, 2018). Thus, I layer gender role 
congruity theory (GRCT) onto signaling theory to explore how gender might impact signal 
interpretation. 
4.3 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
4.3.1 Signaling Theory  
To illustrate how observable proxies or signals can be used to increase a decision-
maker’s ability to make informed choices, Spence (1973) theorizes about the difficulty 
employers have when trying to predict a job candidate’s productive capability, an inherently 
unobservable quality. The “informational gap” between job candidates (who, at least 
presumably, know their ability) and employers (who cannot) introduces uncertainty into the 
hiring decision. To reduce this uncertainty, Spence (1973, p. 357-8) argues that job candidates 
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can transmit information regarding their otherwise unobservable ability to employers in the form 
of a “signal,” or an observable characteristic that is subject to manipulation2. According to 
Spence (1973), to the extent that employers believe one’s education, for example, to be a reliable 
predictor of one’s ability, job candidates who signal their educational credentials to employers 
can bridge the informational gap, thereby providing the basis for a more informed hiring 
decision. 
Since the publication of Spence’s (1973) article, the main tenets of signaling theory have 
been supported across a broad range of disciplines and contexts (e.g., Bird & Smith, 2005; 
Connelly et al., 2011). One area in particular that has been of interest to signaling theory scholars 
is entrepreneurial financing. Given that entrepreneurs tend to lack objective measures of their 
startups’ credibility, such as a long history of exchange and/or a proven track record of 
performance (Stinchcombe, 1965), investors are often at an information deficit compared to 
entrepreneurs, which, in turn, introduces uncertainty into the investment decision. Accordingly, 
entrepreneurs that succeed in attracting financial capital have been found to be those that are able 
to bridge the informational gap by communicating observable signals of their startups’ otherwise 
unobservable potential for success to a host of traditional investor groups, including angels (e.g., 
Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2015; Prasad et al., 2000), venture capitalists (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 
2004; Busenitz et al., 2005; Plummer et al., 2016), and banks (e.g., Eddleston et al., 2016). 
Among the myriad signals of a new venture’s quality that have been found to be predictive of 
financial investment are human capital (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004; Becker-Blease & Sohl, 
2015; Beckman, Burton, & O’Reilly, 2007; Courtney, Dutta, & Li, 2017; Gompers, Kaplan, & 
                                                        
2 Note, Spence (1973) distinguishes signals from “indices,” which he defines as attributes not 
generally thought to be alterable, such as gender and race. 
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Mukharlyamov, 2016; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Hoenig & Henkel, 2015; Plummer et al., 2016; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003), intellectual capital (e.g., Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 
2015; Baum & Silverman, 2004; Block, De Vries, Schumann, & Sandner, 2014; Hoenig & 
Henkel, 2015; Haeussler, Harhoff, & Mueller, 2014; Hoenen, Kolympiris, Schoenmakers, & 
Kalaitzandonakes, 2014; Nadeau, 2010; Zhou, Sandner, Martinelli, & Block, 2016), social 
capital (e.g., Vismara, 2016), firm age and size (e.g., Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; 
BarNir, Gallaugher, & Auger, 2003; Haines, Orser, & Riding, 1999; Eddleston et al., 2016), 
strategic partnerships (e.g., Plummer et al., 2016; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Stuart, Hoang, & 
Hybels, 1999; Hoenig & Henkel, 2015), and the entrepreneur’s willingness (e.g., Leland & Pyle, 
1977; Vismara, 2016), commitment (e.g., Wilson et al., 2007), and personal investment (e.g., 
Busenitz et al., 2005).  
Two general patterns can be identified from extant signaling literature that have bearing 
on the present study. From a theoretical standpoint, not all receivers seem to be attracted by the 
same signals in the same way. For example, patents have been found to be effective in attracting 
venture capitalists (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2004; Nadeau, 2010), but not crowdfunders (e.g., 
Ahlers et al., 2015). Similarly, while prior investment by family and friends has been found to be 
a positive signal for business angels, it has been found to be a negative signal for venture 
capitalists (Conti, Thursby, & Rothaermel, 2013). The reason for such differences, according to 
(Drover, Wood, et al., 2017), is that signaling relies, in part, on the cognitive interpretations of 
those to whom the signal is directed and this largely depends on the receiver’s subjective mental 
model.  
From an empirical standpoint, the overwhelming majority of signaling research to date 
has focused on signals that reflect a firms’ economic performance (Rawhouser et al., 2017), 
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leaving issues specific to social startups at least partially unaddressed. Moreover, studies of how 
economic and social signals impact non-traditional investors’ decisions show mixed results. For 
example, while some scholars have found that crowdfunders tend to respond more positively to 
social signals such as sustainability orientations (Calic and Mosakowski, 2016), social value 
orientations (Moss et al., 2018), and narratives that frame the social venture as an opportunity to 
help others (Allison, Davis, Short, & Webb, 2015), others have found crowdfunders to be more 
likely to invest in social ventures that signal autonomy, competitive aggressiveness, and risk-
taking (e.g., economic signals) as opposed to conscientiousness, courage, empathy, and warmth 
(e.g., social signals) (Moss, Neubaum, & Meyskens, 2015). Interestingly, this preference for 
economic signals over social signals was also found in social venture capitalists (SVCs) and 
although SVCs do rely on social signals, such as a focus on a social mission and a demonstrated 
passion to enact social change, they seem to rely most heavily on traditional economic criteria 
(Miller & Wesley, 2010).  
Taken together, these two patterns demonstrate that while many different types of 
organizations invest in startups, each perceives the signals sent by these ventures very 
differently. Given the hybrid context in which the startups that SIAs evaluate intend to operate 
(Lall et al., 2013; European Investment Fund, 2017), both social and economic signals should be 
important to SIA selection decisions. However, because SIAs represent a unique form of investor 
that has not previously been subjected to empirical analysis, coupled with the fact that prior 
research on other social investors is mixed, how SIAs actually perceive these signals remains an 
empirical question. Thus, I consider in the sections below how economic and social signals are 
likely to affect SIA selection decisions.  
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Prior equity investment as an economic signal. Equity financing represents the exchange 
of ownership for both capital and mentorship between entrepreneurs and investors. Given that 
equity investors are generally willing to risk their capital only if a startup has the potential to 
achieve a return of five to ten times the initial investment (Bussgang, 2014), entrepreneurs who 
successfully raise equity investment should be able to deliver a strong economic signal to other 
external parties of the significant upside potential of their startups in at least two ways. First, 
signaling that the venture has received an equity investment communicates to SIAs that the 
venture has already passed a rigorous financial analysis validating the viability and sustainability 
of its business model (Madill, Haines, & RIding, 2005; Stuart et al., 1999). Second, an equity 
investment signals that the venture will have access to the equity investor’s superior resources, 
capabilities, and networks, all of which should enhance its prospects for scale and survival 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hsu, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999). In support of this logic, equity 
investment has been widely used and accepted in the empirical literature on signaling as a 
credible signal of a firm’s economic potential (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 
2006; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, & Hambrick, 2010; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
As noted above, the challenge facing SIAs is that while the upside economic potential of 
a social startup is a critical factor in the decision-making process (Lall et al., 2013; European 
Investment Fund, 2017), it does not manifest in a readily observable characteristic, a condition 
that results in an informational gap between the entrepreneur and the SIA. Given the high-quality 
information that an equity investment conveys about the financial health and potential of a social 
startup, entrepreneurs that send such a signal should be able to bridge this gap, thereby reducing 
uncertainty on the part of the SIA. As a result, I expect SIAs to interpret equity investment as a 
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credible proxy for a social startup’s economic prospects and, therefore, favor social startups that 
communicate having received such an investment when making selection decisions.  
Hypothesis 1: SIAs are more likely to accept social startups that have received 
equity investment (an economic signal) than social startups that have not received 
equity investment. 
Prior philanthropic investment as a social signal. A mission to serve others and/or bring 
about positive social change is a defining feature that distinguishes social startups from 
traditional startups (Dees, 1998). While social startups tend to be highly committed to their social 
missions early on in their history, they face conflicting demands that often arise from their 
commitment to simultaneously pursue both business and social motives in their ventures. This 
performing tension (Smith & Lewis, 2011) often leads these ventures to stray from that mission 
in pursuit of revenue generation over time. This process, known as mission-drift (Hockerts, 
2006), “can create dissonance and interfere with critical processes of organizational 
identification on which much positive behavior depends” (Tracey & Phillips, 2007, p. 267) and 
may ultimately lead to venture failure (Foreman & Whetten, 2002). While mission-drift has, 
perhaps not surprisingly, been argued to be a major concern for social startups and those who 
support them (Hockerts, 2006), it is a difficult phenomenon to predict a priori due to its 
unobservable nature. Thus, SIAs who are interested in selecting startups that will generate 
positive social impact over the long-run (Lall et al., 2013; European Investment Fund, 2017) 
must often rely on signals of their commitment to a social mission. Following the logic 
supporting the receipt of equity investment as a signal of economic merits, I contend that receipt 
of philanthropic investment can convey a venture’s social merits. 
Philanthropy, which “conjoins a resolute sentiment of sympathetic identification of 
others, a thoughtful discernment of what needs to be done, and a strategic course of action aimed 
at meeting the needs of others” (Schervish, 1998, p. 600), is provided by a range of institutions 
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from non-profit organizations, to foundations, to for-profit companies (Scarlata & Alemany, 
2010). Such investments are generally driven by an institution’s desire to achieve religious, 
social, and/or ecological motives that are either aligned with its investing ethos (Schäfer, 2004; 
Gray, Bebbington, & Collison, 2006) or intended to enhance its reputational capital by advancing 
the social causes that are important to its stakeholders (Brammer & Millington, 2005). In either 
case, philanthropic investors have a vested interest in the long-term ability of the ventures they 
support to realize their social missions. Accordingly, social startups that are able to communicate 
that they have received philanthropic investments should be able to deliver a strong signal to 
external parties of their ability to meaningfully impact society because philanthropy is not simply 
a passive, giving, or donating behavior, but rather a proactive, results-driven, value-creating, 
social return-seeking one ( Dees & Jacobson, 2000; Porter & Kramer, 1999). In fact, many 
companies position philanthropy as a “strategic investment” to showcase their social intentions 
and social involvement (Porter & Kramer, 2002). Viewed in this light, it is clear that 
philanthropic investment can deliver on bringing about meaningful social change ( Dees & 
Jacobson, 2000; Porter & Kramer, 1999) and the non-monetary resources, such as advice and 
links to other social enterprises provided by philanthropic investors can help the venture avoid 
mission drift (Dees and Jacobson, 2000; Hockerts, 2006).  
As with economic signals, social signals provide SIAs with credible information that can 
reduce the uncertainty they face when evaluating a social startup’s otherwise unobservable 
potential for social impact. Given the high quality information that a philanthropic investment 
conveys about a social startup’s ability to deliver on its social mission without drifting away 
from it, entrepreneurs that send such a signal should be able to reduce the information 
asymmetry between the entrepreneur and the SIA and, in turn, the uncertainty surrounding the 
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selection decision. As a result, I expect that SIAs will interpret philanthropic investment as a 
credible proxy for a social startup’s commitment to a social mission and, therefore, favor social 
startups that have received such an investment when making selection decisions.  
Hypothesis 2: SIAs are more likely to accept social startups that have received 
philanthropic investment (a social signal) than social startups that have not 
received philanthropic investment. 
4.3.2 Gender Role Congruity Theory  
The previous two hypotheses suggest that economic and social signals should improve a 
social startup’s likelihood of being selected by a SIA though the logic underpinning these 
hypotheses assumes that SIAs will make selection decisions without bias. However, as Alsos and 
Ljunggren (2017, p. 573) observe, “signals are valuable only in how they are interpreted by the 
receiver” and how an individual may interpret a signal has been shown to be a function of, 
among other factors, their cognitive biases (Drover, Wood, et al., 2017; Connelly et al., 2011). 
Thus, for social entrepreneurs seeking to signal the quality of their ventures to SIAs, it is critical 
that these signals be interpreted by the SIA in the way that the entrepreneur intended, without 
any bias. 
While many potential cognitive biases that might influence signal interpretation exist, I 
turn my attention to the global issue of gender bias ( Buss, 1989; Connell, 1987) because it is 
“fundamental in the structuring of society” ( Jennings & Brush, 2013, p. 667). More specific to 
the present study, gender bias has been shown to be a significant factor in the unequal 
engagement levels in entrepreneurial activity for men and women across the globe (e.g., Kelley, 
Brush, Greene, & Litovsky, 2011). In particular, gender stereotypes have been found to have a 
negative effect on women’s levels of self-efficacy (Sweida & Reichard, 2013), which has, in 
turn, been found to decrease entrepreneurial intentions (Gupta, Turban, Wasti, & Sikdar, 2009; 
Chen, Greene, & Crick, 1998; Chowdhury & Endres, 2005; Gatewood, Shaver, Powers, & 
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Gartner, 2002; Kourilsky & Walstad, 1998). Perhaps not surprisingly, women have been found 
to be less likely than men to become self-employed (Hughes, 1999;   Lerner, Brush, & Hisrich, 
1997; Robinson & Sexton, 1994). 
Gender stereotypes have also been shown to have a negative impact on the perceptions 
external resource providers have towards women. For example, extant research suggests that 
gender biases often cause investors to view women as less competent than men and investors 
have been found to charge female entrepreneurs higher interest rates (e.g., Fraser, 2005; Wu & 
Chua, 2012), ask them to disclose more information before providing them with financing 
(e.g.,Constantinidis et al., 2006; Murphy et al., 2007), and invest significantly less venture 
capital into their ventures (e.g., Kanze et al., 2018; Malmström et al., 2017) as compared to male 
entrepreneurs. Given the prevalence of gender bias across a broad range of external evaluators of 
entrepreneurs, I suspect that it will unintentionally influence SIA evaluations of entrepreneurs 
and I, therefore, explore its effect on the efficacy of economic and social signals below.  
Unlike sex, which reflects biological differences, gender is a socially constructed notion 
(Gupta et al., 2009), which manifests in “socially and culturally defined prescriptions and beliefs 
about the behavior and emotions of men and women” (Anselmi & Law, 1998, p. 195). In other 
words, perceptions of gender lead to stereotypes ascribed to each sex (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Powell & Graves, 2003) and while women are commonly associated with low-status, subordinate 
roles, and communal traits such as compassion and honesty, men tend to be associated with high-
status, leadership-oriented roles, and agentic/Darwinian traits such as determination and 
competitiveness placing women at a disadvantage in both employment and entrepreneurship 
opportunities (e.g., Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly & Wood, 2011; Eddleston et al., 
2016; Gupta et al., 2009; Powell & Eddleston, 2013; Ridgeway, 2001,  2014; Ridgeway & 
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Correll, 2004; Alsos, Isaksen, & Ljunggre, 2006; Carter et al., 2007; Marlow & Patton, 2005; 
Orser, Riding, & Manley, 2006; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011).  Blau and Kahn (2017) provide an 
excellent overview of the gender wage gap and highlight although the gender wage gap has 
declined considerable during 1980 to 2010, the gender pay gap declined much more slowly in the 
upper echelons of management. 
Gender role congruity theory (GRCT) builds upon these global gender stereotypes by 
comparing beliefs about how men and women should behave (injunctive norms) with 
understandings of how men and women actually behave (descriptive norms) (Eagly & Karau, 
2002). In essence, GRCT suggests that when injunctive and descriptive norms are congruent 
(e.g., when women assume subordinate roles or when men display agentic traits), individuals 
will be viewed more favorably than when injunctive and descriptive norms are incongruent (e.g., 
when women assume leadership roles or when men display communal traits). These gender 
stereotypes are so deeply embedded in the mental models of most individuals that GRCT 
research finds that both men and women endorse these gender stereotypes (e.g.,  Moss-Racusin, 
Phelan, & Rudman, 2010; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). As 
an example, research exploring perceptions of men and women in the workplace (a masculine 
domain) suggests that both men and women perceive female leaders/managers less favorably and 
as less competent than male leaders/managers ( Eagly & Karau, 2002; Gupta et al., 2009; Inesi & 
Cable, 2015; Marlow, 2002; Northouse, 2018) due to the perceived incongruity between the 
attributes required for success in business (descriptive norms) and those ascribed to male and 
female gender roles (injunctive norms).  
By serving as a shortcut in one’s heuristic decision-making process (Heilman, 2001), 
gender stereotypes can easily influence the interpretation of a signal ( Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017) 
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and in recent research applying GRCT, Eddleston et al. (2016) find that female entrepreneurs 
receive smaller loan amounts than male entrepreneurs even when both groups send the same 
signals, an outcome they contend is due to the incongruity between the injunctive norms 
associated with the female gender role and gendered understandings of the practice of 
entrepreneurship. Similarly, Lee and Huang (2018) find evidence to suggest that while women-
led ventures are perceived to be less viable than male-led ventures (given that leading a startup is 
inconsistent with the injunctive norms associated with the female gender role), women can 
actually reduce this gender disadvantage by signaling the social and environmental welfare 
benefits (attributes that are consistent with female-based injunctive norms) of their ventures. 
Recent research on entrepreneurship across the globe also finds that female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to pursue social missions (Calic& Mosakowski, 2016; Hechavarria et al., 2012; 
Meyskens et al., 2011) and attract more crowdfunding than men (Greenberg & Mollick, 2017) 
due to the perception that they are more trustworthy (Johnson et al., 2018). In other words, 
gender bias may not always manifest in prejudice against women, even when operating in a 
context with masculine attributes. Building upon this logic, while I expect gender bias to 
influence how SIAs interpret social entrepreneurs’ signals and consistent with GRCT, I contend 
that both male and female entrepreneurs will experience better outcomes in SIA selection 
decisions when their gender and the signals they communicate about their social startups are 
congruent.  
As noted above, SIAs, are interested in accepting startups that are likely to achieve 
financial success and growth while also delivering on a social mission over the long-run (Lall et 
al., 2013; European Investment Fund, 2017). For this reason, I hypothesized that signals that 
credibly convey the likelihood that a social startup will achieve these ends should factor 
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prominently in an SIA’s decision-making process. However, in accordance with GRCT, I 
suspect that how each of these signals is perceived by the SIA is likely to be impacted by the SIA 
decision-maker’s mental model. As Alsos and Ljunggren (2017, p. 573) argue, the extent to 
which mental models are biased by gender stereotypes will “influence how investors, as signal 
receivers, interpret the signals sent by male and female entrepreneurs” and “because investors 
have been found to hold gendered ideas on the institutional model of a successful 
entrepreneur … one can assume that the receivers apply a gender filter when they assess the 
signalers and their signals”. In other words, when an economic signal (reflective of a descriptive 
norm) is sent by an entrepreneur whose gender is congruent with the agentic traits assumed to 
result in business success (reflective of injunctive norms) – e.g., when sent by a man – the signal 
is likely to pass seamlessly through the receiver’s gender filter and, thus, be interpreted as 
evidence of the venture’s unobservable potential for financial success. Yet, when the same signal 
is sent by an entrepreneur whose gender is incongruent with these injunctive norms – e.g., when 
sent by a woman – it is likely to conflict with the receiver’s gender filter and, in turn, be ascribed 
as less credible (Eagly, 1987). Following this logic, because women are typically ascribed a 
communal role (Eagly, 1987), their gender is generally perceived to be congruent with the 
message a philanthropic investment conveys; namely, a commitment to creating value for others 
and delivering positive social impact. Therefore, when such a signal is sent by a woman, it aligns 
with the receiver’s gendered mental model and is, therefore, likely to factor favorably into the 
SIA’s decision-making process.  
In sum, rather than focusing solely on the inherent quality of a signal to make an 
informed decision, decision-makers often interpret signals through gendered filters. Accordingly, 
I hypothesize that the entrepreneurs’ gender will influence the credibility of the signals they send 
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such that when the global stereotypes associated with an entrepreneur’s gender are congruent 
with the signal (that is, when an economic signal is sent by a male entrepreneur or when a social 
signal is sent by a female entrepreneur), the positive effect of the signal will be stronger than 
when those stereotypes are incongruent with the entrepreneur’s gender (that is, when an 
economic signal is sent by a female entrepreneur or when a social signal is sent by a male 
entrepreneur). Figure 6 summarizes the conceptual model.  
Hypothesis 3: Gender will moderate the relationship between signaling and SIA 
acceptance, such that SIAs are more (less) likely to accept social startups when 
they send signals that are congruent (incongruent) with the stereotypes associated 
with the lead entrepreneurs’ gender. More specifically: 
Hypothesis 3a: Social startups that send economic signals are more 
(less) likely to be accepted by SIAs when the lead entrepreneur is male 
(female). 
Hypothesis 3b: Social startups that send social signals are more 
(less) likely to be accepted by SIAs when the lead entrepreneur is female 
(male). 
4.4 Method 
4.4.1 Data and Sample  
The sample is drawn from the Global Accelerator Learning Initiative, an initiative of the 
Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE), which focuses on promoting 
entrepreneurship in developing markets. From 2013 to 2017, ANDE surveyed entrepreneurs 
doing business in emerging markets across the globe that applied to a network of 203 SIAs. 
ANDE collected detailed data from these entrepreneurs at the time of the application to the SIAs 
and then subsequently on an annual basis in order to capture follow-up data (ANDE Annual 
Report, 2018). The data used in this study is from the initial survey only, which was 
administered during the application process. At the end of 2017, the database contained 13,495 
observations; however, I restrict the sample in two ways. First, because 2016 was the first year 
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data on acceptance/rejection to an SIA was documented, I limit the sample to responses from 
2016 and 2017. Second, in order to avoid double-counting any startups that applied to SIAs in 
both 2016 and 2017, I limit the sample to startups that were founded in the same year they 
applied to an SIA (e.g., startups that were founded in 2016 and applied to SIAs in 2016 and 
startups that were founded in 2017 and applied to SIAs in 2017). After applying these 
restrictions, the sample consists of 2,324 unique startups that applied to 123 accelerators. To 
ensure that there were no startups in the sample that applied to more than one SIA, I checked for 
duplicates using the unique identification number assigned by ANDE to each startup and each 
SIA, and did not find any. Table 4 provides acceptance rates for the startups in the sample, based 
on the gender of the lead entrepreneur and the presence or absence of economic and social 
signals.  
4.4.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in this chapter is whether or not the social 
startup was accepted by the SIA to which it applied. This variable is dichotomous and is coded 
one if the startup was accepted and coded zero if it was rejected.  
Independent variables. The survey asked respondents to identify the sources from which 
their ventures had received any outside equity, with response options including angel investors, 
venture capitalists, other companies, government sources, or other. Given the legitimacy that an 
equity investment conveys about the viability of a startup’s business model and its ability to 
generate lucrative financial returns, I operationalize an economic signal as a dichotomous 
variable, coded one for respondents that indicated having received an equity investment from any 
one of the sources listed above and coded zero for respondents that indicated not having received 
any equity investment. Similarly, the survey asked respondents to identify the sources from 
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which their ventures had received philanthropic investment, with response options including 
other companies, government agencies, foundations or other nonprofits, fellowship programs, 
business plan competitions, or crowdfunding campaigns. Given legitimacy that a philanthropic 
investment conveys about a startup’s commitment to and ability to deliver on a social mission, I 
operationalize a social signal as a dichotomous variable, coded one for respondents that indicated 
having received a philanthropic investment from any one of the sources listed above and coded 
zero for respondents that indicated not having received any philanthropic investment.  
Moderator variable. The survey asked respondents to identify up to three of the startup’s 
founders. According to a report summarizing the ANDE database (ANDE Annual Report, 2018, 
p.7), the first founder listed for each startup in the dataset is the lead entrepreneur. Using the 
gender data each respondent provided for this lead entrepreneur, I operationalize gender as a 
dichotomous variable, coded one for female-led startups and coded zero for male-led startups.  
Control variables. To account for additional effects that might also impact selection 
decisions by SIAs, I control for the following. At the venture level, because different SIAs may 
have different preferences for the sectors in which they tend to select startups, I control for the 
primary sector in which the startup operates (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003) by including a set of 
dummy variables for agriculture, health, and information technology, with “other” as the 
reference group. Given that different SIAs may also have different preferences in terms of the 
nature of the social impact they seek to support, I also control for the startups’ impact objectives 
by including a set of dummy variables that identify the primary type of impact each startup 
sought to address: access to water, agriculture products, and community development, with 
“other” as the reference group. Additionally, because non-profit and for-profit organizations 
have intrinsic differences in structures, policies, and strategies ( Hull & Lio, 2006; O’Connor & 
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Raber, 2001), I control for the startups’ legal status by including dummy variables for both non-
profit and for-profit, with “undecided/other” as the reference group. According to Baum and 
Locke (2004), when entrepreneurs make their visions explicit, they are more motivated to 
achieve them, which make them more attractive to SIAs. Thus, in order to account for different 
levels of motivation, I control for the startups’ social motives as a dummy variable, coded as one 
if the startup explicitly stated it had social motive, and zero otherwise. Lastly, given evidence 
that a firm’s intellectual capital is an important indicator of its innovative capabilities, which 
tends to attract investors (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Nadeau, 2010), I control for each startup’s 
intellectual capital by including a dummy variable, coded as one if the venture holds any patents, 
and zero otherwise.  
At the entrepreneur-level, prior research has shown that owners’ growth expectations are 
positively related to actual firm growth (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003); thus, I control for the 
entrepreneurs’ financial goals for their startups, coding respondents who sought to “cover costs 
and earn profits” as one and respondents who sought only “to cover costs” as zero. Given 
evidence that accelerator selection decisions are influenced by demographic factors in addition to 
gender, I also control for the age, prior management experience (Baum & Silverman, 2004); 
Beckman et al., 2007), and prior entrepreneurial experience (Burton, Sørensen, & Beckman, 
2002; Hsu, 2007) of the lead entrepreneur. Assuming a curvilinear relationship between an 
entrepreneur’s age and selection probability, I include first- and second- order terms of the lead 
entrepreneur’s age (logged to eliminate skew). Additionally, I include dummy variables for both 
prior management experience and prior entrepreneurial experience, coding each as one if the lead 
entrepreneur had the requisite experience, and zero otherwise.  
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4.4.3 Model Specification  
The data structure of the final sample is hierarchical with the social startups (level 1) 
nested the SIAs (level 2). In such cases, multilevel modeling is preferred over traditional 
statistical modeling because a multilevel modeling can (1) provide an unbiased systematic 
analysis of how covariates measured at various levels of a hierarchical structure affect the 
outcome variable and how the interactions among covariates measured at different levels affect 
the outcome variable; (2) correct for the biases in parameter estimates resulting from clustering; 
and (3) provide robust standard errors and, thus, robust confidence intervals and significance 
tests (Guo & Zhao, 2000). In order to account for the fact that the data does not include 
information on the decision-maker at each accelerator and that the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, I model the data with random effects (Greene, 2003) and apply a generalized linear 
mixed-effect model (GLMM) that can account for both random effects and selection probability. 
Using Stata 15, I utilize the meprobit command in order to fit the data with a mixed-effects 
probit model. The conditional distribution of the response variable, given the random effects 
noted above, is assumed to be Beronoulli, with success probability determined by the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function.  
When interpreting the results of such a model, two issues are worth noting. First, as with 
other non-linear models, the coefficients reported from a mixed-effect probit regression do not 
indicate the actual magnitude of an effect. Second, the signs of and the p-values associated with 
the coefficients of any interaction terms reported from a mixed-effect probit regression may not 
necessarily reflect the actual direction or significance of the interaction (Hoetker, 2007). Thus, in 
order to determine the nature and significance of the main and interaction effects in the mixed 
effects probit regression, thereby facilitating the interpretation of the findings, I must calculate 
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marginal probabilities for the coefficients of interest. To accomplish this, I use the margins 
command in Stata 15 in order to generate average marginal effects using the coefficients 
generated from the mixed effects probit regression. Conceptually, the marginal effect of a 
function is the slope (first derivative) of that function and in Stata 15, the margins command 
evaluates this derivative for each observation and reports the average of the marginal effects 
(StataCorp, 2017).  
As a final point, because marginal probabilities are simply the average probabilities for 
each variable, further testing must be carried out to determine whether each marginal probability 
is significantly different from other marginal probabilities of interest. For this comparison, I use 
a contrast analysis. In Stata 15, the contrast command estimates factor variables and their 
interactions from the most recent mixed effects probit regression and allows us to determine 
whether any differences in the derived marginal probabilities across groups (e.g., selection 
probabilities for female-led startups with social signals vs. selection probabilities for female-led 
startups without social signals) are statistically significant (Casella & Berger, 2001).  
4.5 Results  
Table 5 reports Pearson correlations for all variables. This table suggests that the data is 
normally distributed and that multicollinearity is not likely to confound subsequent results.  
4.5.1 Main effects 
The results of the mixed effect probit analysis can be found in Table 6. I enter control 
variables in Model 1 and then add the independent variables in Model 2 to test hypotheses 1 and 
2. The significance of the Wald χ" statistics indicates each model’s fit, the significance of the 
likelihood ratio test statistics indicates that the mixed-effect probit model gives us more accurate 
estimations than the traditional probit model, and the decreases in both the Akaike and Schwarz's 
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Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC, respectively) from Model 1 to both Model 2 and 
Model 5 indicate improved model fit with the addition of the independent variables. These post-
estimation tests suggest that the models are not mis-specified and fit the data well.  
The results of Model 1 suggest that SIAs are, in general, more likely to accept social 
startups that operate in the health sector, possess intellectual capital (in the form of patents), are 
looking to earn a profit, and have middle-aged lead founders. Using coefficients from Model 1, I 
can also calculate the average probability that a social startup will be accepted into an SIA. 
Specifically, a marginal effect analysis of this data suggests that, holding all control variables 
constant at their means, a social startup has, on average, a 20.41% probability (p = 0.000) of 
being accepted by an SIA.3 It must be noted that this statistic reflects the acceptance rate for 
social startups as a function of the specific vector of control variables included in the study and, 
thus, differs from the overall acceptance rate for the full sample shown in Table 7 which is a 
function of other factors not included in the analysis. 
Model 2 tests the first two hypotheses. As these results show, the coefficient for 
economic signals is positive and significant, indicating that Hypothesis 1, which states that SIAs 
are more likely to accept social startups when they send economic signals (# = 0.638, p = 
0.000), is supported. Similarly, the coefficient for social signals is positive and significant, 
indicating that Hypothesis 2, which states that SIAs are more likely to accept social startups 
when they send social signals (# = 0.460, p = 0.000), is also supported. These results hold in the 
full model as well (see Model 5). 
                                                        
3 Analysis not reported herein, but available from the authors upon request. 
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4.5.2 Moderation effects 
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I include the interaction term for gender and economic 
signals in Model 3 and the interaction term for gender and social signals in Model 4. Models 3 
and 4 show significant Wald χ" statistics, indicating model fit, and likelihood ratio test statistics, 
indicating accurate estimations of the data. In addition, the AIC and BIC decrease from Model 1 
to Model 3 and from Model 1 to Model 4, suggesting improved model fit with the addition of the 
interaction variables. This evidence suggests that these models are not mis-specified and fit the 
data well. As with the main effect hypotheses, the results of the moderation hypotheses also hold 
in the full model (see Model 5). 
As noted earlier, the direction and significance of an interaction term in a mixed-effects 
probit regression cannot be assessed by examining the sign of or p-value associated with its 
coefficient (Hoetker, 2007). In order to interpret the nature and significance of the effect of 
interaction terms in probit models, it is necessary to conduct a marginal effects analysis on the 
regression coefficients for these terms (Hoetker, 2007). Using the coefficients generated in 
Models 3 and 4, I conduct such an analysis, which yields the marginal probabilities for 
acceptance into SIAs by male- and female-led startups reported in Table 7.  
To better visualize the moderation effect of gender on selection probability, I plot the 
marginal probabilities from Table 4 in Figure 7, where the reference line indicates the average 
selection probability (20.41%) as determined from Model 1. As the results in Table 4 and Figure 
7 suggest, the probability of a male-led social startup with economic signals being selected in 
SIAs is 37.69%, compared to only 18.19% of female-led startups, and the selection probability of 
female-led social startups is 37.45% when they send social signals, compared to only 25.88% of 
male-led startups. While these results would appear to lend support to Hypothesis 3a, which 
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states that SIAs will be less likely to accept social startups whose economic signals are sent by 
female (as opposed to male) entrepreneurs, and Hypothesis 3b, which states that SIAs are more 
likely to accept social startups whose social signals are sent by female (as opposed to male) 
entrepreneurs, it must be noted that while these marginal probabilities are statistically significant 
in the model, the p-values only indicate the marginal probability for each subgroup compared to 
the entire applicant pool (e.g., male-led startups with economic signals vs. all startups). What 
these marginal probabilities do not tell us is whether there is a significant difference between 
specific subgroups (e.g., male-led startups with economic signals vs. female-led startups with 
economic signals). To determine whether such statistical differences exist, I conduct a contrast 
analysis. Simply put, a contrast analysis is used to test the difference between two means to 
determine if each mean is statistically different from the other.  
The results of the contrast analysis are presented in Table 5. These results suggest that the 
probability that an SIA will accept a social startup that sends an economic signal is 19.65% 
lower when the lead entrepreneur is female than when the lead entrepreneur is male. As this 
difference in acceptance rates is significant, I conclude support for Hypothesis 3a. These results 
also indicate that the probability that an SIA will accept a social startup that sends a social signal 
is 11.80% higher when the lead entrepreneur is female than when the lead entrepreneur is male. 
As this difference in acceptance rates is significant at the p < 0.10 level, I conclude weak support 
for Hypothesis 3b. Collectively, the results of all of the moderation tests suggest that SIAs are 
more likely to accept social startups when they send signals that are congruent with the 
stereotypes associated with the lead entrepreneurs’ gender and less likely to accept social 
startups when they send signals that are incongruent with these stereotypes; thus, I conclude 
support for Hypothesis 3. 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
In this dissertation, I tried to systematically analyze the newcomer, the accelerator, of the 
entrepreneurial financing landscape, by reviewing relevant literature, redefine and 
reconceptualize the domain, conceptually identify their unique values along the venture creation 
pipeline and empirically examine the selection results of one special type of this institution. In 
this final Chapter, I will summarize main findings from prior chapters, highlight the 
contributions and also discuss the limitation and my future research.  
5.1 Main Findings and Implications 
5.1.1 Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, I systematically reviewed recent literature on accelerators, compared and 
contrast different definitions of accelerators, and extended the existing definition to redefine 
accelerators as “Accelerator is a fixed term, cohort-based program aiming at enhancing 
startups’ competency. Besides receiving mentorship and education, selected teams (in for-profit 
accelerators) or winning teams on a public pitch event or demo-day (in non-for-profit 
accelerators) will receive a small amount of seed capital.” In addition, I also applied the 
Entrepreneurial Value Creation Theory (Mishra & Zachary, 2014) to develop the “dual-role” 
model of accelerators to 1) delineate the boundary of accelerator from other similar institutions 
(e.g., incubators and venture investors, etc.) and 2) to illustrate the heterogeneity of accelerator 
programs. This Chapter contributes to current accelerator literature by providing a systematic 
review on its long-lasting definitional issue, and also provide a fundamental ground for other 
following chapters.  
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5.1.2 Chapter 3  
Entrepreneurship ecosystems are seen as a regional economic development strategy 
(Spigel & Harrison, 2017). Scholars (Dabson, Rist, & Schweke, 1994; Harrison & Kanter, 1978; 
Lichtenstein et al., 2004; Lyons & Hamlin, 2001) have argued that the effects of this strategy are 
more sustainable and more cost-effective than the other major economic development strategies 
of business attraction and business retention/expansion. A strong and well-functioning 
entrepreneurship ecosystem should be led by entrepreneurs (Stam, 2015) who are actively 
learning from each other and sharing resources. To build a well-functioning entrepreneurship 
ecosystem, policy makers need to have a good understanding of how to facilitate high-growth 
ventures’ entrepreneurial activities, rather than providing “economically inefficient blanket 
support for all types of new firm creation” (Spigel & Harrison, 2017, p.153). The key to being an 
“enterprise facilitator” is to find, nurture and develop entrepreneurs, encourage them to pursue 
their dreams, counsel them and connect them to other sources of assistance (Sirolli, 1999). 
However, as state earlier, Lichtenstein et al (2004) have pointed out that most enterprise 
development activities are fragmented and categorical in terms of the needs addressed, making 
entrepreneurs look at these offerings as a maze, with no entry point and no clear exit.  
Chapter 3 makes two main contributions to both the current entrepreneurship ecosystem 
and accelerator literatures. First, I provide a holistic view of all three subsystems in the 
entrepreneurship ecosystem and illustrate how they interdependently function to develop 
entrepreneurs from lower-level to higher-level skills. This is important for both policy makers 
and entrepreneurs. The pipeline model helps policy makers to differentiate entrepreneurs and 
their ventures by referencing two variables (their skills and the life cycle stages of their 
businesses) and mapping the three subsystems to better assess and manage the ecosystem. 
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Entrepreneurs can use this pipeline map to help them to determine where they are now and to 
decide which type of accelerator they should approach for help.  
Second, I contribute to the extant accelerator literature by clarifying different types of 
accelerators. Although this literature has reviewed the heterogeneity of accelerator programs and 
created typologies of them, few articles deeply discuss how they are different and the unique 
value that different types of accelerators might bring to their selected startups. In this chapter, I 
do not only specify where each type of accelerator fits into the pipeline model, but also point out 
the expected outcomes of participating in different types of accelerators. It is important for 
entrepreneurs to understand the type of accelerator that best fits their own unique objectives. In 
addition, this knowledge also provides pragmatic guidance for accelerator directors in designing 
and managing their accelerator programs more effectively. 
5.1.3 Chapter 4 
Drawing on signaling theory, I hypothesized that SIAs would view both economic and 
social signals positively when making selection decisions. The empirical results offer support for 
these main effect hypotheses and suggest that SIAs’ reliance on these signals in their decision-
making process is consistent with the dual logic used by similar organizations, such as SVCs 
(Miller & Wesley, 2010). Despite this generalized finding, I acknowledge prior research that 
suggests that in order for signals to be effective, they must be interpreted as intended, without 
bias (Park & Mezias, 2005). Thus, I contextualize the main effect hypotheses by leveraging 
GRCT in order to argue that the effect of these signals on acceptance is likely to be strongest 
when they are congruent with the stereotypes associated with the lead entrepreneurs’ gender. The 
results also support these moderation hypotheses and suggest that economic signals are most 
likely to result in SIA selection when they are sent by male entrepreneurs and that social signals 
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are most likely to result in SIA selection when they are sent by female entrepreneurs. In both 
cases of gender role congruity, the increase in selection probability (compared to startups that 
send no signals) is roughly equal (an increase of 19.13% for social startups with male 
entrepreneurs and an increase of 16.16% for social startups with female entrepreneurs) and 
significantly exceeds the acceptance rates for social startups sending incongruent signals.  
This evidence, while not conclusive, suggests that under conditions of congruity, women 
who lead social startups may not just be less disadvantaged than men as prior research has 
suggested (e.g., Lee & Huang, 2018), but may actually be at an advantage compared to them. 
While this is good news for female entrepreneurs, the findings also reveal a striking difference in 
selection probability in cases where incongruity exists between the descriptive norms 
communicated by a signal and the injunctive norms associated with the sender’s gender. 
Specifically, I find that while the acceptance rate for social startups with male entrepreneurs 
increases by 7.32% when they send social signals, the acceptance rate for social startups with 
female entrepreneurs decreases by 3.10% when they send economic signals. In other words, 
compared to social startups that send no signals whatsoever, those that send incongruent signals 
are slightly better off when the lead entrepreneur is male but are actually worse off when the lead 
entrepreneur is female. The unfortunate irony of these findings is that although SIAs appear to 
select social startups with female entrepreneurs at a higher rate than those with male 
entrepreneurs, they nevertheless still appear to be exhibiting gender bias toward women. I 
discuss the results and their implications for theory and practice below.  
5.1.3.1 Implications for Theory 
I believe this research reveals important insights about the interplay of signaling theory 
and GRCT by highlighting the subjective aspects of signal interpretation in the SIA selection 
 
 
 66 
process. According to  Drover, Wood, et al., (2017, p. 2, emphasis added), “the vast majority of 
research on organizational signaling tends to investigate the ways in which a positive signal—in 
isolation—influences the decision-making of external constituents,” and point out a flawed 
fundamental assumption of most prior organizational studies that apply signaling theory; namely, 
that signals will be interpreted rationally and unidirectionally by receivers. By highlighting the 
fact that decision-makers’ interpretations of signals are often influenced by their own implicit, 
and often unconscious, biases, this research supports Spence’s (2002) argument that, in addition 
to the signals they intentionally send, actors often unknowingly communicate a wide range of 
additional information that affects how they are judged and evaluated. While signaling theory 
has conventionally focused on minimizing uncertainty that results from incomplete information, 
the findings support Drover, Wood, et al., (2017) cognitive view of signaling theory and show 
that sometimes more information on the entrepreneur (e.g., gender) can also lead to unintentional 
misinterpretation.  
I believe the results show that the congruity of the signals social entrepreneurs send with 
global gender stereotypes may be one such source of information that can bias signal 
interpretations and may help explain past findings on the disadvantages in which female 
entrepreneurs find themselves when seeking access to startup assistance. As noted above, there is 
a wealth of empirical evidence suggesting that external resource providers overwhelmingly 
exhibit bias toward female entrepreneurs (Fraser, 2005; Wu & Chua, 2012; Constantinidis et al., 
2006; Murphy et al., 2007; Eddleston et al., 2016; Malmström et al., 2017) as compared to their 
male counterparts, causing female entrepreneurs to be less likely to have access to the same 
financing options than male entrepreneurs as they seek to create and grow their businesses 
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(Coleman, 2000; Coleman & Robb, 2012; Sara & Peter, 1998; Haines et al., 1999; Becker-
Blease & Sohl, 2007;  Greene et al., 2001; Nelson & Levesque, 2007).  
In seeking to explain these findings, scholars have argued that the observed differences in 
access to entrepreneurial resources are not due to a lack of competence on the part of female 
entrepreneurs, but rather a perception of a lack of competence in eyes of external evaluators 
(Carter et al., 2007; Marlow & Patton, 2005; Murphy et al., 2007). In fact, research has shown 
these perceptions to be unfounded, as women entrepreneurs have been found to not only be 
better credit risks than male entrepreneurs (Watson & Robinson, 2003) but also out-survive male 
entrepreneurs in a wide variety of industrial and geographic contexts (Kalnins & Williams, 
2014). While provocative, I contend that the implications of this literature are somewhat 
constrained due to the fact that most prior research in the area has focused on for-profit ventures 
seeking to gain access to financial resources. Given the masculine nature of these contexts, 
coupled with the gendered understanding of what it means to be an entrepreneur (Jennings & 
Brush, 2013), it is perhaps no surprise that investors have generally been found to show less 
interest in women entrepreneurs. Indeed, the finding that social startups sending economic 
signals are more likely to be accepted by SIAs when the lead entrepreneur is a man (as opposed 
to a woman) stands in support of this notion.  
What has received less scholarly attention, however, are those contexts that are aligned 
with feminine gender roles, leading Jennings and Brush (2013, p.686) to question “whether male 
entrepreneurs operating in stereotypically feminine industries experience subtle or even overt 
forms of discrimination by resource providers.” In response, a small but growing stream of 
research has begun to examine such contexts and highlight certain conditions that challenge the 
conventional understanding of gender bias and hint at situations in which women might not 
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always experience worse outcomes than men. For example, in their study of sustainable 
businesses, Lee and Huang (2018) find that by emphasizing their ventures’ social impact, female 
entrepreneurs can increase the overall perception of a venture’s viability given that this framing 
is congruent with female gender stereotypes. Similarly, research on social entrepreneurship finds 
that women are more likely to pursue social missions than male entrepreneurs (Calic & 
Mosakowski, 2016; Hechavarria et al., 2012; Meyskens et al., 2011). Given this evidence, it is 
perhaps not surprising that women have been found to attract more crowdfunding than men 
(Greenberg & Mollick, 2017) due to the perception that they are more trustworthy (Johnson et 
al., 2018). Notwithstanding the contribution these studies makes to the understanding of gender 
bias in feminine contexts, it is important to note that because it focuses only on the ways in 
which gender stereotypes may benefit women, it ignores the inherent complexity of gender bias. 
It is this complexity that I have sought to unpack in this study. By integrating signaling theory 
with GRCT in the context of SIAs, I argue that whether or not female entrepreneurs will be at an 
advantage or disadvantage compared to male entrepreneurs is dependent upon the congruity 
between the dual signals they send and the stereotypes associated with their gender. By 
supporting this argument, this study extends prior work in the area by providing a more nuanced 
understanding of the role gendered mental models may play as external actors evaluate startups 
in hybrid settings. On the one hand, the finding that SIAs prefer male entrepreneurs who send 
masculine signals and female entrepreneurs who send feminine signals suggest that the effect of 
gender bias on signal interpretation is balanced as both male and female entrepreneurs achieve 
better outcomes from gender congruity. This is consistent with research on shifting standards and 
stereotypes. For example, Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997) find evidence to suggest that 
judgements based on objective criteria (such as the economic and social signals) tend to lead to 
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evaluations consistent with stereotypes, which they liken to a “flower blooming in spring.” On 
the other hand, the finding that acceptance rates increase above the base rate for male 
entrepreneurs when they send feminine signals but decrease below the base rate for female 
entrepreneurs when they send masculine signals suggest a much less optimistic view of gender 
bias as male entrepreneurs seem to achieve far better outcomes from gender incongruity than 
female entrepreneurs. By underscores the uneven effect of gender bias on signaling, this finding 
adds an important nuance to Biernat and Kobrynowicz's (1997) work. Specifically, while these 
authors do find evidence that a strong effort by low status groups (e.g., women) can lead to more 
favorable outcomes, I find that this effect, which they liken to a “flower blooming in winter,” 
occurs only in the case of high status groups (e.g., men). Given this evidence, the findings 
suggest that SIAs may have lower standards for male than female entrepreneurs despite their 
explicit interest in accepting more women. 
In sum, by finding evidence that congruity between signals and gender stereotypes 
enables gender bias to work in an entrepreneur’s favor, this chapter both supports a central tent 
of GRCT and extends GRCT into a new context of inquiry, namely SIAs. More importantly, 
however, by finding evidence that incongruity leads to better outcomes for men more than 
women, my chapter is arguably the first GRCT study to suggest that all forms of gender role 
congruity are not necessarily created equal and that, where incongruity is present, double 
standards that disadvantage women compared to men may exist. This possibility is troublesome 
given recent research by Grimes, Gehman, and Cao (2018, p. 133) that suggests that women 
enter social entrepreneurship at higher rates than men as it provides “a means for those women 
owners to engage in identity work, authenticating values which are deemed central and 
distinctive.” While the values associated with social entrepreneurship are certainly congruent 
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with feminine injunctive norms, whether they will have the opportunity to realize them by 
gaining acceptance into a SIA is unclear. Thus, I believe the conclusion that the gender bias 
toward women that has long been found to exist in masculine contexts is also present, albeit 
more subtly, in hybrid contexts to be an important contribution to GRCT and, therefore, 
encourage scholars to explore other hybrid contexts in order to assess the extent to which this 
phenomenon applies more broadly. 
5.1.3.2 Implications for Practice 
In addition to contributing to the theoretical understanding of the role gender stereotypes 
play in the signaling process, I believe the results may also have important implications for SIAs 
themselves given the light they shed on biases in their decision-making logic. According to 
ANDE’s 2017 Impact Report (2017, p. 13), “in 2017, 65% of ANDE members who worked 
directly with [small and growing businesses] or entrepreneurs said they prioritize gender 
inclusion.” Of those, 86% indicated that supporting women as entrepreneurs (as opposed to 
women as leaders, employees, clients, etc.) was “the top gender gap they aim to address.” As 
evidence of this dedicated effort, the selection percentages from Table 4 show that the SIAs in 
the sample, which are affiliated with ANDE, accept female-led social startups at a substantially 
higher rate, on average, than male-led social startups (19% vs. 14%, respectively). While this 
overall preference for women is laudable, by analyzing the data more closely I see that, despite 
their explicit efforts to support women, the SIAs affiliated with ANDE are, perhaps implicitly, 
nevertheless exhibiting bias against them. As the results of the marginal effects and contrast 
analyses show, SIAs appear to only view women as credible when the signals they send 
communicate communal traits (e.g., such as compassion and honesty; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & 
Diekman, 2005; Eagly & Wood, 2011; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011) that are consistent with the 
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injunctive norms associated with their gender. When female entrepreneurs send signals 
communicating agentic/Darwinian traits (e.g., determination and competitiveness; Eagly, 1987; 
Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly and Wood, 2011; Fauchart & Gruber, 2011) that violate beliefs 
about how women ought to behave, SIAs appear to view them as less credible. 
Randall Kempner, ANDE’s Executive Director, alludes to this implicit bias in ANDE’s 
2017 Impact Report. In his opening letter, he proudly acknowledges the strides ANDE members 
have made toward eliminating the gender gap among small and growing businesses, writing “I’m 
encouraged by how ANDE members are working to close gaps in access to finance for women 
entrepreneurs. I’ve seen improvement since last year’s revelation of an egregiously low 
percentage of investment vehicles focused on women. ANDE members are laying the 
groundwork for a renewed focus on gender inclusion” (ANDE 2017 Impact Report, 2017, p. 4). 
Despite this progress, he adds that “we still have a long way to go until women entrepreneurs are 
taken as seriously as men” (ANDE 2017 Impact Report, 2017, p. 4, italics added). Consistent 
with the findings, Kempner’s admission suggests that while SIAs appear, at face value, to be 
favoring female entrepreneurs, they are actually only favoring those women that adhere to 
gender stereotypes (e.g., “flowers blooming in spring;” Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997)). Those 
women that exhibit what are widely accepted to be masculine traits, however (e.g., “flowers 
blooming in winter;” Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997)), are simply not taken “seriously” (to use 
Kempner’s terminology) by SIAs.  
Given that this gendered understanding of what it means to be a social entrepreneur 
appears to be rooted in perceptions (e.g., injunctive norms) versus reality (e.g., descriptive 
norms), I suspect that SIAs are missing out on supporting viable social startups led by women. 
This bias in decision-making not only hurts social entrepreneurs who are denied valuable startup 
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assistance and the communities they aim to serve, but also negatively impacts the SIAs 
themselves as they benefit when the social startups they support succeed. Thus, whether to 
consciously support female entrepreneurs, to advance meaningful social causes, or to merely 
further their own self-interest, I advise SIAs to confront the unconscious, and perhaps 
unintended, biases reflected in their decision-making processes. As one potential solution, I 
suggest SIAs initiate a blind review process that removes gender information from decision-
making, at least early on in the process. By eliminating identifying characteristics from 
applications, SIAs can ensure that all social entrepreneurs that communicate their startups’ 
potential to generate financial returns and deliver on a social mission will, regardless of their 
gender, be taken seriously. On the other hand, SIAs may also want to consider gender-balanced 
selection panels or consider implementing a balanced portfolio approach that might better reflect 
their applicant pool. Quotas for women entrepreneurs, while possibly controversial, may also be 
an option for some SIAs to consider. The SIAs in this study have explicitly stated a focus on 
selecting women entrepreneurs and I urge them to be aware of subconscious bias that may creep 
in during their selection process. Implementing policies that may help counter this bias is a 
crucial next step.   
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Although I tried my best to make my dissertation as comprehensive and as systematic as 
possible, it still has several limitations that I hope I can eventually turn them into my future 
research opportunities. Firstly, although I integrated the pipeline model with extant 
entrepreneurship ecosystem literature to explain how different types of accelerators create 
different values to entrepreneurs, I was not able to collect sufficient data to empirically test my 
propositions of values brought by different types of accelerators. In my future research, I plan to 
 
 
 73 
keep my data collection process, and empirically test whether these propositions in my Chapter 3 
will hold.  
 The second general limitation is that I only empirically examined the selection results of 
one specific type of accelerators (SIAs), but not other types of accelerators. The cognitive 
perspective of signaling theory suggests that the selection results do not only reflect objective 
signals but also signal receivers subjective signal interpretation process. Hence, given their 
innate differences embedded in initial organization designs (Pauwels et al., 2016), SIAs selection 
logics and results must be different from other accelerators because they should have different 
institutional logics, different organization goals, and different strategy sets. Considering the 
effects on applied startups of accelerators’ selection decisions, it will be meaningful to keep 
collecting data from all different types of accelerators and comparing their selection logics and 
results. 
 Thirdly, in Chapter 4, I am also aware of some unavoidable limitations. To begin, given 
that startups are often founded by teams, it is likely that the gender of co-founders may also play 
a role in the selection process. For example, an all-male or all-female vs. a mixed-gender 
founding team may shape the decision-making process of SIAs in ways unaccounted for in this 
study. While I believe that the gender of the lead entrepreneur to be the most influential in the 
evaluation of a startup, especially where gender biases are concerned, I do not dismiss the 
possibility that some female-owned startups and some male-owned startups may experience 
different acceptance rates to the extent that they have co-founders of the opposite gender. 
Unfortunately, data on the gender composition of the founding teams in the sample is 
circumscribed given that respondents in the ANDE database were only able to provide 
information on up to three (at most) founders. Moreover, examining the dynamics of gender 
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composition on teams introduces a host of theoretical issues that exceed the scope of the present 
study. In light of these issues, I advise scholars interested in this area of research to explore 
gender diversity on entrepreneurial teams in future studies.  
In addition, while I believe that equity and philanthropic investment represent relevant, 
credible signals of a social startup’s economic and social merit, I acknowledge that other signals 
may also be important to SIAs and influenced by gender. As noted above, I have chosen to focus 
on investment in general given research suggesting that the ability to acquire resources is an 
important signal to any potential investor and equity and philanthropic investment in particular 
given the information they provide SIAs about the ability for a startup to succeed in the hybrid 
context in which they intend to operate. Nevertheless, I suspect that other signals, including 
those captured in the vector of control variables (e.g., startup experience, managerial 
experience), may also communicate important information to SIAs and encourage scholars 
interested in this area of research to explore those effects in future studies. 
On a related note, I also note that in operationalizing equity and philanthropic investment, 
my measurement model captures only the presence or absence of an economic or social signal 
and not the signals’ strength. Thus, it is possible that the amount or source of investment (e.g., 
equity investment from a government agency vs. from a VC) and/or the number of investors 
(e.g., one philanthropic investor vs. multiple investors) may add information about a social 
startup’s credibility. In light of prior signaling research suggesting that some sources of 
investment are perceived as more credible than others (Khoury et al., 2013; Pollock et al., 2010), 
I urge scholars interested in this area of research to consider examining how the nature of equity 
or philanthropic investment might affect SIA selection decisions. Relatedly, given that access to 
both equity and philanthropic investment is highly competitive, it is not surprising that only 291 
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of the 2,324 cases (or 12.52%) in the sample was able to send an economic and/or social signal.  
Coupled with the historically low acceptance rates by accelerators of all kinds (as noted by 
Ortmans (2016) and reinforced in Table 4), I advise readers to view the results in the context of 
the relatively small numbers of entrepreneurs in each category that were ultimately accepted by 
the SIAs in the sample. 
Although the decision to focus on gender bias was made in light of evidence that it is one 
of the most prevalent biases across all cultures throughout the world (Buss, 1989; Connell, 1987) 
and should, therefore be generalizable to the context of interest, I acknowledge that many other 
sources of bias exist that may also influence the meaning and value of a given signal. 
Consequently, I propose that gender bias is, at best, a sufficient criterion for signal interpretation, 
but is not a necessary one. Accordingly, I advise scholars interested in this area of research to 
explore the role that other forms of bias may play in influencing a startup’s access to resources.  
Though I believe the global nature of the sample to be a strength of our study, I 
acknowledge there are likely nuances in how it informs the mental models of decision-makers 
across the 123 different SIAs in the sample due to idiosyncratic differences in micro- (e.g., their 
own gender), meso- (e.g., SIA preferences toward gender inclusion), and/or macro- (e.g., cultural 
norms) level characteristics. Given that the SIAs in the sample were distributed all across the 
world, I would have liked to control for such effects in order to account for any heterogeneity in 
decision-making. Unfortunately, the ANDE database does not include any identifying 
information on the decision-makers, the SIAs themselves, or countries in which they are located. 
As noted above, I attempted to account for any random effects SIA heterogeneity would have on 
selection by fitting the data with a mixed-effects probit model; however, to the extent that any 
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such differences across SIAs have biased the results, I advise readers to accept the results 
guardedly. 
The decision to focus on GRCT was due to my belief that SIAs (like most signal 
receivers) interpreted the signals sent by social startups through a gendered lens. Consistent with 
GRCT, I hypothesized that entrepreneurs who send signals that align with gender stereotypes 
will be at an advantage to those that violate them. Notwithstanding the empirical support for 
these hypotheses, it is possible that the positive effects of congruity or the negative effects of 
incongruity could be mitigated when both signals are present. While GRCT does not provide 
theoretical insight into such a relationship, it would nevertheless be interesting to test via a three-
way interaction among gender, economic signals, and social signals. Unfortunately, as Table 4 
shows, only 13 startups in the sample sent both signals, and among that subset no women were 
accepted. As such testing for a three-way interaction is not possible. However, as these numbers 
increase over time as more data is collected, I encourage scholars to explore what, for now, 
remains an empirical question. In the interim, I believe research employing experimental 
techniques, whereby researchers can manipulate the signal type based on the gender of 
participant, may extend the findings of the present study.  
Finally, as SIAs are a relatively new phenomenon in the broader social entrepreneurship 
area, this is the first study to my knowledge to explore SIA decision-making. While I believe that 
my study provides valuable insight into the types of decisions SIAs make and offers a 
compelling explanation for why they make them, the cross-sectional approach I adopted due to 
the limited number of years (two) of data that were available, does not allow us to prove a causal 
effect. Thus, I encourage future scholars to investigate the selection process at the cognitive 
level, through longitudinal, experimental, and/or qualitative research designs, in order to confirm 
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whether and how SIA decision-makers interpret signals through gendered mental models. Given 
the important role organizations that startup assistance organizations using a dual logic (e.g., 
SIAs, SVCs, microfinanciers, socially-responsible investors) are having in the social 
entrepreneurship ecosystem, I believe that a deeper understanding of how they interpret signals is 
essential.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 Literature Review of Accelerator Studies 
No Author and 
Year 
Types of 
Accelerator 
Research 
Question 
Research 
Method 
Key Findings 
1 Radojevich-
Kelley, N., 
& Hoffman, 
D. L. (2012).  
Seed 
accelerator 
What do 
accelerators do 
and what are 
their results? 
Case study 1) Accelerator companies use unique 
selection criteria and have higher 
success rates for their graduates;  
2) Mentorship driven programs 
increase the overall success rates 
of start-ups by providing 
entrepreneurs with access to angel 
investors and venture capitalists 
which tend to increase success 
rates 
2 Winston 
Smith, S., 
Hannigan, T. 
J., & 
Gasiorowski, 
L. L. (2013).  
General* how do 
accelerator-
driven 
mechanism 
interact with 
crowdfunding-
driven 
mechanism to 
launch new 
companies 
Quantitative 
Study 
Accelerator-backed startups: 
1) receive the first round of follow-up 
financing significantly sooner; are 
more likely to be either acquired or 
to fail;  
2) are founded by entrepreneurs from 
a relatively elite set of universities; 
and  
3) exhibit substantially greater 
founder mobility amongst other 
accelerator-backed startups.  
3 Cohen, S., & 
Hochberg, 
Y. V. 
(2014).  
General What is the 
"accelerator" 
phenomenon?  
Conceptual 
Study 
Described:  
1) value of these programs; 
2) Definition of accelerator programs; 
3) the differences between 
accelerators, incubators, angel 
investors and co-working 
environments; and 
4) the importance of the various 
aspects of these programs to the 
ultimate success of their graduates, 
the local entrepreneurship 
ecosystems 
 
 
 79 
4 Fehder, D. 
C., & 
Hochberg, 
Y. V. 
(2014).  
General What impacts 
that accelerators 
bring to local 
region 
Quantitative 
Study 
The arrival of an accelerator associated 
with an annual increase of 104% in the 
number of seed and early stage VC 
deals in the MSA, an increase of 
1830% in the total $$ amount of seed 
and early stage funding provided in the 
region, and a 97% increase in the 
number of distinct investors investing 
in the region.  
5 Hallen, B. 
L., Bingham, 
C. B., & 
Cohen, S. 
(2014, 
January).  
Seed 
accelerator 
Whether or not 
the 
"acceleration" 
effect exists?   
Quantitative 
Study 
1) Acceleration effects are 
difficult to be achieved by all 
accelerators; 
2) accelerators are complements 
to (and not substitute for) 
more experienced and 
connected founders 
6 Wise, S., & 
Valliere, D. 
(2014). 
seed 
accelerator, 
University 
accelerator 
How do 
accelerators' 
managers' 
experiences 
influence their 
performance 
Quantitative 
Study 
The direct startup experience of 
accelerator managers matters more than 
their connectedness to the ecosystem 
7 Regmi, K., 
Ahmed, S. 
A., & Quinn, 
M. (2015).  
General Assess the 
effectiveness of 
accelerators 
Descriptive  1) The number of accelerators in the 
US is in the rise, while the growth 
has slowed down significantly 
after a very high rise in 2012. 
2) Startups that graduated from 
accelerator programs have 
approximately 23% higher survival 
rate than other new businesses. 
8 Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 
2015 
Corporate 
Accelerators 
How large 
corporations 
from the tech 
industry have 
begun to tap 
into 
entrepreneurial 
innovation from 
startups. 
Qualitative 
Study 
Corporate accelerator is one 
mechanism that corporate could use to 
engage with startups that balance speed 
and agility against control and strategic 
direction, and to bridge the gap 
between themselves and the startup 
world 
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9 Hochberg, 
Y. V. 
(2016).  
General What is the 
"accelerator" 
model and their 
effects on 
regional 
environment 
Conceptual 
Study 
Summarize prior conceptual studies on 
accelerators by describing the 
phenomenon, emphasizing its 
definitions, differentiating it from 
incubators, business angels, coworking 
spaces and venture capitalists, and 
identify current evolving trends 
10 Kanbach & 
Stubner, 
2016 
Corporate 
Accelerators 
What is the 
"corporate 
accelerator"? 
How do they 
function and 
why they exist? 
Qualitative 
Study 
Identify four different types of 
corporate accelerators:  
1) listening post;  
2) Value chain investor; 
3) Test laboratory; 
4) Unicorn hunter. 
Propose that they are different from 
each other in terms of their objectives 
and configurations. 
11 Kohler, 2016 Corporate 
Accelerators 
How to design 
corporate 
accelerators in a 
more effective 
way? 
Quantitative 
Study 
To leverage startups' innovation and to 
make corporate accelerators an 
effective part of a firm's overall 
innovation strategy, managers need to 
systematically and thoughtfully 
consider the design dimensions of 
proposition, process, people and place 
12 Pauwels, C., 
Clarysse, B., 
Wright, M., 
& Van 
Hove, J. 
(2016).  
General What is the 
"accelerator" 
model and its 
taxonomy based 
on different 
design logics? 
Qualitative 
Study 
Identify  
1) three design themes (categories) 
of accelerator model: "Ecosystem 
builder", "Deal-flow maker", 
"Welfare stimulator", and  
2) five design elements--program 
packages; strategic focus; selection 
process; funding structure; alumni 
relations 
13 Plummer et 
al, 2016 
General How do 
accelerators 
magnify other 
"signals" of 
young ventures 
when they 
pursue financing 
opportunities 
Quantitative 
Study 
A startup's characteristics and actions 
are signals that remain relatively 
unnoticed unless a startup combines 
them with a third-party affiliation that 
enhances the signal's value, thus 
increasing the likelihood of receiving 
external capital 
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14 Battistella, 
Toni & 
Pessot, 2017 
General How can start-
ups benefit from 
participation in 
an accelerator 
program from 
an open 
innovation 
perspective? 
Qualitative 
Study 
Dyadic co-creation with accelerator 
network partners and crowdsourcing 
are revealed to be effective practices 
provided by accelerators that benefit 
startups most. But participating in 
accelerators cannot substitute the 
founding team intrinsic characteristics 
15 Leatherbee 
& Gonzalez-
Uribe, 2017 
(AoM 
presentation) 
Ecosystem 
accelerator 
(social 
accelerator; 
impact 
accelerator)  
Do business 
accelerators 
affect new 
venture 
performance? 
Quantitative 
Study 
Entrepreneurship schooling bundled 
with basic services can significantly 
increase new venture performance, but 
no support for causal effects of basic 
services by them own 
16 Goswami, 
K., Mitchell, 
J. R. and 
Bhagavatula, 
S. (2018) 
General What 
intermediary 
role do 
accelerators 
play in 
developing 
regional 
entrepreneurship 
ecosystems? 
Qualitative 
Study 
Accelerator play a key intermediary 
role in linking founders to their 
regional entrepreneurship ecosystems; 
four accelerator expertise: connection, 
development, coordination, and 
selection 
17 Cohen, 
Bingham & 
Hallen, 2018  
Private 
Accelerator 
Why some 
accelerators are 
more effective 
than others? 
Quantitative 
Study 
Accelerators that provide concentrated 
consultation, foster comparisons, and 
require activities can help participating 
entrepreneurs overcome their bounded 
rationality 
*When authors did not specify which type of accelerators they studied, either they use “accelerator” as a broad item containing all types, or they 
simply refer to the most common type of accelerators: standalone seed accelerator
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Table 2. Entrepreneurs at Different Skill Levels And Commensurate Service Providers 
 Tech Managerial  Entrepreneurial Personal  Service Providers 
Majors Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding Venture capitalists, Professional consulting practices, investment bankers, etc. 
AAA High High High High Angel investors, emerging business consulting practices, university tech transfer offices 
AA High Medium Medium Medium Manufacturing extension programs, small business development centers, small 
specialized venture funds, high-technology incubation programs, etc. 
A High and/or 
medium 
Low Low Low Micro-enterprise programs, small business development centers, business incubation 
programs, etc. 
Rookie Low and/or 
no 
Low and/or no Low and/or no Low and/or 
no 
Micro-enterprise programs, youth entrepreneurship programs, etc. 
Source:  Adapted from Lichtenstein & Lyons (2006) 
 
Table 3. Stages of New Ventures 
Stages Descriptions 
Stage 0 This phase begins with either an interest or desire on the part of an entrepreneur to start a business, or an idea for a business, 
and ends with the emergence or birth of an organization with an economic offering (e.g., a produce or a service) ready to be 
sold to a potential client and to generate revenue. 
Stage 1 This phase begins when the business is launched (with a product or service ready for sale) and ends when the business has 
reached breakeven from sales. The business has passed the first preliminary test of survival—its offering has demonstrated 
some interest by a small set of customers, although acceptance by the “market” has not yet been demonstrated. Profitability 
has not yet been achieved, and the venture’s continued viability (i.e., its ability to maintain a separate existence) is not 
assured. However, the business exhibits potential. 
Stage 2 This phase begins with breakeven from sales and if successful, ends with the establishment of a sustainable business—with 
either healthy or marginal profits. The latter pays a living wage (i.e., a “mom-and-pop” operation), whereas the former 
would be positioned to grow further. This level of economic viability or measure of stability has been achieved by securing 
and satisfying a critical mass of customers and producing sufficient cash flow to at least repair and replace the capital assets 
necessary to continue the business as those assets wear out. This assures the survival of the business as long as market 
conditions remain the same. 
Source: Lichtenstein & Lyons (2006) 
 
  
 
 
 83 
 
Table 4. Overview of The Sample 
    All  
  startups 
  Male-led   
  startups 
  Female-led  
  startups 
Full sample 
Accepted 367 16% 223 14% 123 19% 
Rejected 1,957 84% 1,379 86% 517 81% 
        
Neither signal 
Accepted 296 15% 174 13% 101 18% 
Rejected 1,737 85% 1,216 87% 461 82% 
        
Only economic signal 
Accepted 24 26% 21 27% 3 18% 
Rejected 70 74% 56 73% 14 82% 
        
Only social signal 
Accepted 44 24% 25 20% 19 32% 
Rejected 140 76% 99 80% 40 68% 
        
Both signals 
Accepted 3 23% 3 27% 0 0% 
Rejected 10 77% 8 73% 2 100% 
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Selected            
2. Survey year (2017)  0.104***           
3. Sector (agriculture)  0.013 (0.047)*          
4. Sector (IT)  (0.048) (0.024) (0.133)         
5. Sector (health)  0.062** (0.021) (0.110) (0.141)        
6. Sector (other) (0.014) (0.060)** (0.446) (0.570)*** (0.472)***       
7. Impact objective (water)   0.016 0.043 (0.014) (0.047) (0.028)  0.062**      
8. Impact objective (agricultural productivity)  0.027 (0.047)*  0.686*** (0.109)*** (0.071)*** (0.295)*** (0.012)     
9. Impact objective (community development) (0.036) (0.029) (0.013) (0.017) (0.079)***  0.071*** (0.019) (0.032)    
10. Impact objective (others) (0.021) (0.007) (0.061)** (0.021) (0.020) (0.066)*** (0.027) (0.065)*** (0.023)   
11. Intellectual capital  0.004  0.020  0.068*** (0.054)** (0.013)  0.006  0.089***  0.064** (0.004)  0.011  
12. Profit goal  0.063** (0.015)  0.046* (0.027) (0.020)  0.002  0.003  0.061** (0.078)***  0.011  0.012 
13. Legal status (non-profit) (0.005)  0.053** (0.026) (0.061)**  0.027  0.044* (0.013) (0.016)  0.121*** (0.004) (0.008) 
14. Legal status (for-profit) (0.001) (0.076)***  0.031  0.103*** (0.061)** (0.056)** (0.029)  0.016 (0.117)*** (0.002)  0.036 
15. Legal status (other)  0.004  0.052** (0.018) (0.077)***  0.053**  0.034  0.043* (0.007)  0.051**  0.005 (0.036) 
16. Explicit social motive (0.034)  0.108***  0.066** (0.111)***  0.029  0.013  0.051*  0.121***  0.166***  0.146***  0.050* 
17. Age (0.057)**  0.007  0.023 (0.016)  0.014 (0.011) (0.008)  0.013  0.005  0.019  0.061** 
18. Age (squared) (0.058)**  0.015  0.022 (0.014)  0.020 (0.016) (0.010)  0.011 (0.003)  0.018  0.071*** 
19. Prior management experience (0.012)  0.006  0.048* (0.034)  0.043* (0.032)  0.054**  0.024  0.016  0.042*  0.107*** 
20. Prior entrepreneurial experience (0.028)  0.009  0.050* (0.048)* (0.012)  0.013  0.048*  0.059** 0.044*  0.044*  0.096*** 
21. Gender (female)  0.066**  0.033 (0.014) (0.101)***  0.052**  0.051** (0.027) (0.025)  0.061** (0.018) (0.052)** 
22. Economic signals  0.057** (0.043)* (0.028)  0.012  0.060** (0.030) (0.010) (0.038)  0.026  0.019  0.065*** 
23.Social signals  0.067**  0.027  0.013 (0.055)**  0.049*  0.001 (0.008)  0.035  0.039*  0.029  0.089*** 
Observations  2324  2627  2627  2627  2627  2627  2627  2627  2627  2627  2627 
Mean  0.158 0.432  0.094  0.145  0.104  0.657  0.129  0.088  0.148  0.102  0.056 
Standard deviation  0.365 0.495  0.292  0.352  0.305  0.475  0.113  0.284  0.355  0.302  0.231 
 
Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
12. Profit goal             
13. Legal status (non-profit) (0.412)***            
14. Legal status (for-profit)  0.277*** (0.533)***           
15. Legal status (other) (0.027) (0.087) (0.797)***          
16. Explicit social motive  0.004  0.028 (0.057)**  0.047*         
17. Age (0.019)  0.022 (0.037)  0.028 (0.007)        
18. Age (squared) (0.016)  0.022 (0.038)  0.028 (0.002) 0.956***       
19. Prior management experience  0.008  0.019 (0.029)  0.021   0.051* 0.101***  0.117      
20. Prior entrepreneurial experience  0.043* (0.019)  0.016 (0.005)  0.024 0.105***  0.123***  0.481***     
21. Gender (female) (0.013)  0.055** (0.091)***  0.068***  0.051* (0.001) (0.011) (0.069)*** (0.107)***    
22. Economic signals  0.038 (0.042)*  0.064** (0.045)* (0.017)  0.010  0.006  0.098***  0.111*** (0.048)*   
23.Social signals (0.025)  0.092*** (0.065)***  0.011  0.070*** (0.038) (0.049)*  0.070***  0.102***  0.017  0.039*  
Observation  2,197  2627  2627  2627  2197  2,578  2,578  2,627  2,627  2544  2627  2627 
Mean  0.905  0.055  0.830  0.115 0.860  3.447  11.966  0.218  0.441  0.279  0.041  0.078 
Standard Deviation  0.293  0.228  0.376  0.319 0.347  0.294   1.768  0.413  0.497  0.448  0.199  0.268 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6 Mixed-effect Probit Analysis: Selection Probability 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 
Survey year (2017) 0.164 0.189  0.189  0.155  0.180 
Sector (agriculture) 0.106  0.125  0.107  0.131  0.133 
Sector (health ) 0.367***  0.327*  0.355**  0.352** 0.340*** 
Sector (information technology) (0.225)  (0.223) (0.229) (0.220)  (0.223) 
Impact objective (water) 0.109  0.105  0.109  0.144 0.144 
Impact objective (agriculture productivity) 0.157  0.172 0.180  0.142  0.165 
Impact objective (community development) (0.145)  (0.158)  (0.163)  (0.138)  (0.158) 
Intellectual capital 0.271†  0.187  0.248 0.239  0.213 
Profit goal 0.423* 0.408*  0.418*  0.417*  0.411* 
Legal status (non-profit) 0.141  0.129  0.136  0.111 0.107 
Legal status (for-profit) 0.142  0.127  0.109  0.147 0.113 
Explicit social motive (0.189)  (0.198)  (0.173)  (0.218)†  (0.203) 
Age 7.470† 7.178†  7.213†  7.464†  7.218† 
Age (squared) (1.113)* (1.061)†  (1.073)†  (1.104)†  (1.065)† 
Prior management experience 0.098 0.070  0.077  0.095 0.074 
Prior entrepreneurial experience (0.085)  (0.105)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.116) 
Gender (female) 0.135 0.133  0.192*  0.069  0.126 
Economic signals  0.638*** 0.799***   0.815*** 
Social signals  0.460***  0.315*  0.331* 
Gender (female) * Economic signals    (0.992)*  (0.989)* 
Gender (female) * Social signals    0.372 0.367 
Log Likelihood (737.966) (724.596) (728.422) (730.870) (721.135) 
Wald χ" 40.130*** 65.43*** 58.22*** 53.73*** 71.71*** 
Observations 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025 
Number of accelerators 123 123 123 123 123 
Likelihood ratio test 189.880*** 199.080*** 195.900*** 194.720*** 201.42*** 
AIC 1515.932 1493.193 1500.845 1505.746 1488.27 
BIC 1628.198 1616.686 1624.338 1629.239 1617.377 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7 Marginal Effect Analysis: Selection Probability by Gender and Signal 
  Economic signal Social signal 
Male-led startups Without signal 0.182
*** 0.189*** 
With signal 0.377*** 0.259*** 
    
Female-led startups  Without signal 0.222
*** 0.204*** 
With signal         0.182* 0.375*** 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 8 Contrast analysis: Comparison of Selection Probabilities by Gender and Signal 
 With economic signals With social signals  
Female-led (vs. male-led) startups -19.65%* 11.80%† 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Note: Sample sizes for all categories provided in Table 4. 
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Figure 1 Conceptual Model of Accelerators’ Added Value to The Entrepreneurship Process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Accelerators’ Preferences on “Dual-role” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stage 2-Monetization Stage 1-Formulation 
 
 
Assistant Institutions e.g., 
Incubator, Co-working, SBDC., 
Universities., etc 
 
 
Assistant Institutions e.g., 
Angles, Venture Capitals, 
Corporate Venture Capitals., etc 
 
 Accelerators: 
Services + Seed Capital 
 
Accelerators have this 
dual-role of assisting 
startups—educational 
role and investor role.  
II _ Balanced 
<E.g., 
University of 
Chicago New 
Venture 
Challenge> 
I: Educator  
<e..g, Mass 
Challenge, 
StartX> 
III_Investor 
<e.g., Y-
combinator; 
TechStars., 
etc> 
For Profit Non-for Profit 
Ta
ke
 E
qu
ity
 
N
o 
Eq
ui
ty
 T
ak
en
 
 
 
 88 
Figure 3 The Accelerator (Dual-Role) Definition Spectrum 
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Figure 4 Entrepreneurship Ecosystem Pipeline 
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Figure 5 Expected Outcomes of Different Types of Accelerators 
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Figure 6 The Conceptual Model of SIA Selection  
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Figure 7 Selection Probability by Gender and Signal 
 
Note: Sample sizes for each category provided in Table 4. 
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